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Abstract. Any set of truth-functional connectives has sequent calculus rules that can
be generated systematically from the truth tables of the connectives. Such a sequent
calculus gives rise to a multi-conclusion natural deduction system and to a version of
Parigot’s free deduction. The elimination rules are “general,” but can be systematically
simplified. Cut-elimination and normalization hold. Restriction to a single formula in the
succedent yields intuitionistic versions of these systems. The rules also yield generalized
lambda calculi providing proof terms for natural deduction proofs as in the Curry-Howard
isomorphism. Addition of an indirect proof rule yields classical single-conclusion versions
of these systems. Gentzen’s standard systems arise as special cases.
§1. Introduction. The literature on structural proof theory and proof-theoretic
semantics, and especially the literature on proof-theoretic harmony, is full of so-
phisticated considerations offering various methods for deriving elimination rules
from introduction rules, articulating criteria for what the meaning expressed or
inherent in an introduction or elimination rule is, and of investigations of partic-
ular sets of rules regarding their proof-theoretic properties and strengths. Rather
than attempt to cut through this multitude of complex and interacting consid-
erations, it may be beneficial to adopt a general perspective. Such a general
perspective may provide insight into the combinatorial reasons why certain sets
of rules and certain ways of constructing calculi have certain properties (such as
cut elimination or normalization).
Here we explore an approach based on the work of Baaz [1984]. This approach
gives a general method for determining rules for a classical sequent calculus
for arbitrary n-valued connectives. Zach [1993] and Baaz, Fermu¨ller, and Zach
[1994] showed that the cut-elimination theorem holds for such systems. The
approach generalizes the classical case: Gentzen’s LK is the result of the method
applied to the truth-tables for the classical 2-valued connectives. Thus, the cut-
elimination theorem for LK can be explained by the structural features of the
sequent calculus together with a semantic feature of the logical rules of LK,
namely that the conditions under which the premises of any pair of left and
right rules are satisfied are incompatible. This is an explanation in the sense
that the specific result for LK follows from a general result about any sequent
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calculus the rules of which satisfy this simple semantic property. A restricted
calculus such as one for intuitionistic logic will also satisfy this property, and so
the explanation extends to LJ. It shows that there is nothing special about the
usual rules for ∧, ∨, →; any truth functional operator can be accommodated
using a general schema of which the usual operators are special cases, and cut-
elimination will hold. Baaz, Fermu¨ller, and Zach [1993] showed how the same
method can be used to obtain multi-conclusion natural deduction systems. This
applies in the 2-valued case as well, and yields natural deduction systems for any
truth-functional connective (e.g., see Zach [2016] for a detailed treatment of the
cases of the nand and nor operators). Here we show that the connections between
multi-conclusion and single-conclusion natural deduction systems generalize, and
that all such systems (multi- or single-conclusion) normalize.
The general result about cut elimination is obtained by considering the rela-
tion between the cut rule in LK and the resolution rule, and observing that a
resolution refutation yields a derivation of the conclusion of a cut (more precisely,
mix) inference from the premises of corresponding left and right logical inferences
directly, using only cuts. This is the essential part of Gentzen’s cut-elimination
procedure. It also underlies the reduction and simplification conversions of the
normalization proof for natural deduction. Rather than attempt to explain the
proof-theoretic harmony enjoyed by specific sets of rules by deriving some of them
from others (e.g., the derivation of elimination rules from introduction rules), we
can explain it as a result of combinatorial features of the rules which flow natu-
rally from the classical semantics. These features are preserved, moreover, when
the calculi are restricted in certain ways to obtain intuitionistic systems.
Combinatorial features of rules can also explain, and be explained by, the prop-
erties we want the full systems they are part of to enjoy. The reduction of cuts
and local derivation maxima requires, and is made possible by, a combinatorial
feature of the left/right (intro/elim) rule pairs, namely that a complete set of
premises can be refuted. The Curry-Howard isomorphism between derivations
and terms in a lambda calculus, and correspondingly between proof reductions
and β-reductions in the lambda calculus, requires, and is made possible by,
the same property. The general perspective taken here shows how the Curry-
Howard correspondence pairs discharge of assumptions with abstraction, and
proof substitutions with reduction, in the following sense: the constructor and
destructor terms corresponding to intro and elim rules require the abstraction of
a variable every time an assumption is discharged. The →-intro rule and simple
λ-abstraction appear as special cases where discharge in a single premise corre-
sponds to abstraction of a single variable, and the constructor function symbol
can essentially be left out.
This perspective is of course not the only possible one. It generalizes the var-
ious proof-theoretic frameworks in one direction, namely sets of connectives and
rules other than the usual set of ¬, ∧, ∨, →. It is applicable to any (set of)
connectives that has a truth-table semantics (in the classical case). The intu-
itionistic case then arises in the same way that LJ arises from LK by restriction
to a single formula in the succedent. Other approaches are more appropriate if
one wants to avoid a semantics as a starting point, or at least not assume that the
connectives considered have a classical semantics. Schroeder-Heister [1984] has
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generalized natural deduction directly by allowing not just formulas, but rules as
assumptions, and considers natural deduction rules for arbitrary connectives in
this framework. Another general perspective is taken by Sambin, Battilotti, and
Faggian [2000], where the generalization covers more kinds of calculi (e.g., sub-
structural systems). They take as their starting point the introduction (right)
rules for a connective and derive the elimination (left) rules from it by a process
of “reflection.” The connection between these two approaches is investigated in
Schroeder-Heister [2013].
In the rest of the paper we review the construction of general sequent calculi
(§2) and show how the usual rules of LK arise as the result of splitting of rules,
to ensure at most formula occurs in the succedent of any premise (§3). From
these sequent calculi we obtain multi-conclusion natural deduction systems with
general elimination rules (§4). The usual natural deduction rules arise by spe-
cializing these general elimination rules (§5). We show that the cut elimination
theorem holds for the sequent calculi so constructed (§6) and that normalization
holds for the multi-conclusion natural deduction systems (§7). The process of
splitting rules guarantees that for any connective there are candidate rules for a
single-conclusion sequent calculus, which relates to the multi-conclusion system
as intuitionistic sequent calculus LJ relates to classical LK. We describe such
“intuitionistic” single-conclusion sequent calculi (§8) and explain how to obtain a
classical single-conclusion system equivalent to the multi-conclusion system (§9).
From single-conclusion sequent calculi we can in turn obtain single-conclusion
natural deduction systems (§10). The rules of single-conclusion natural deduc-
tion correspond to constructors and destructors for a generalized lambda calcu-
lus, of which the usual typed lambda calculus is again a special case (§11). We
describe how the general construction of rules also extends to Parigot’s system of
free deduction (§12), recently rediscovered by Milne as natural deduction with
general elimination and general introduction rules. Finally, we sketch how to
extend the approach to quantifiers (§13).
§2. Complete sets of sequent calculus rules. We recall some terminol-
ogy: A literal is an atomic or a negated atomic formula. A disjunction of literals
is also called a clause and is often often written simply as a set. Thus, the dis-
junction ¬A1 ∨A2 may also be written as {¬A1, A2}. Satisfaction conditions for
clauses under a valuation v are just those of the corresponding disjunction, i.e.,
if C = {L1, . . . , Ln} is a clause, v |= C iff v |= Li for at least one Li. A set of
clauses is satisfied in v iff each clause in it is. Thus, a set of clauses corresponds
to a conjunctive normal form, i.e., a conjunction of disjunctions of literals.
Now consider a truth-functional connective⊛. To say that⊛ is truth-functional
is to say that its semantics is given by a truth function ⊛˜ : {⊤,⊥}n → {⊤,⊥},
and that the truth conditions for a formula A ≡ ⊛(A1, . . . , An) are given by:
v |= ⊛(A1, . . . , An) iff ⊛˜(v1, . . . , vn) = ⊤,
where vi = ⊤ if v |= Ai and = ⊥ otherwise.
As is well known, every truth-functional connective ⊛(A1, . . . , An) can be
expressed by a conjunctive normal form in the Ai, i.e., a conjunction of clauses
in the Ai, and the same is true for its negation. In other words, for every truth
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Table 1. Clause sets and rules for the usual connectives
connective cnfs / C(⊛)+, C(⊛)− rules
∧
A ∧B
{⊢ A;⊢ B}
Γ ⊢ ∆, A Γ ⊢ ∆, B
∧r
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∧B
¬A ∨ ¬B
{A,B ⊢}
A,B,Γ ⊢ ∆
∧l
A ∧B,Γ ⊢ ∆
∨
A ∨B
{⊢ A,B}
Γ ⊢ ∆, A,B
∨r
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∨B
¬A ∧ ¬B
{A ⊢;B ⊢}
A,Γ ⊢ ∆ B,Γ ⊢ ∆
∨l
A ∨B,Γ ⊢ ∆
→
¬A ∨B
{A ⊢ B}
A,Γ ⊢ ∆, B
→r
Γ ⊢ ∆, A→ B
A ∧ ¬B
{⊢ A;B ⊢}
Γ ⊢ ∆, A B,Γ ⊢ ∆
→l
A→ B,Γ ⊢ ∆
function ⊛˜, there is a set of clauses C(⊛)+ which is satisfied in v iff ⊛(A1, . . . , An)
is, and a set of clauses C(⊛)− which is not satisfied iff ⊛(A1, . . . , An) is not.
C(⊛)+ and C(⊛)− are of course not unique.
The Kowalski notation for a clause C = {¬A1, . . .¬Ak, B1, . . . , Bl} (Ai, Bj
atomic) is an expression of the form A1, . . . , Ak ⊢ B1, . . . , Bl. We can now estab-
lish a correspondence between truth-functional connectives ⊛, their associated
clause sets C(⊛)+ and C(⊛)−, and sequent calculus rules for them. If C is a
clause set, then the corresponding set of premises is the set of sequents obtained
from the Kowalski notations of the clauses in C by adding schematic variables
for formula sequences Γ, ∆ in the antecedent and succedent. By a slight abuse
of notation, we use the same meta-variables Ai for the schematic formulas in
the sequent on the one hand, and the atomic formulas in the clause set on the
other. Each premise has the form Π,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λ where the formulas in Π are the
Ai occurring negatively in the respective clause, and those in Λ are the Ai oc-
curring positively. The ⊛l rule is the rule with the premise set corresponding
to C(⊛)− and the conclusion ⊛(A1, . . . , An),Γ ⊢ ∆. The ⊛r rule has a premise
set corresponding to C(⊛)+ and conclusion is Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛(A1, . . . , An). Rules have
the general forms
. . . Πi,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λi . . .
⊛r
Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛( ~A)
and
. . . Πi,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λi . . .
⊛l
⊛( ~A),Γ ⊢ ∆
where the formulas in Πi and Λi in ⊛r correspond to C(⊛)+ and those in ⊛l
to C(⊛)−. We call the occurrence of ⊛( ~A) in the conclusion of such a rule
the principal formula, the formulas in Πi and Λi (or Π
′
i and Λ
′
i) the auxiliary
formulas, and those in Γ and ∆ the side formulas.
Suppose we have a set X of connectives ⊛ with associated ⊛l and ⊛r rules.
The calculus consisting of these rules, the usual structural rules (weakening,
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Table 2. Clause sets and rules for some unusual connectives
connective cnfs / C(⊛)+, C(⊛)− rule
A 9 B
A ∧ ¬B
{⊢ A;B ⊢}
Γ ⊢ ∆, A B,Γ ⊢ ∆
9r
Γ ⊢ ∆, A 9 B
(exclusion)
¬A ∨B
{A ⊢ B}
A,Γ ⊢ ∆, B
9l
A 9 B,Γ ⊢ ∆
A | B
¬A ∨ ¬B
{A,B ⊢}
A,B,Γ ⊢ ∆
|r
Γ ⊢ ∆, A | B
(nand)
A ∧B
{⊢ A;⊢ B}
Γ ⊢ ∆, A Γ ⊢ ∆, B
|l
A | B,Γ ⊢ ∆
A ↓ B
¬A ∧ ¬B
{A ⊢;B ⊢}
A,Γ ⊢ ∆ B,Γ ⊢ ∆
↓r
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ↓ B
(nor)
A ∨B
{⊢ A,B}
Γ ⊢ ∆, A,B
↓l
A ↓ B,Γ ⊢ ∆
A⊕B
(A ∨B) ∧ (¬A ∨ ¬B)
{⊢ A,B;A,B ⊢}
Γ ⊢ ∆, A,B A,B,Γ ⊢ ∆
⊕r
Γ ⊢ ∆, A⊕B
(xor)
(A ∨ ¬B) ∧ (¬A ∨B)
{A ⊢ B;B ⊢ A}
A,Γ ⊢ ∆, B B,Γ ⊢ ∆, A
⊕l
A⊕ B,Γ ⊢ ∆
A→ B/C
(¬A ∨B) ∧ (A ∨ C)
{A ⊢, B;⊢ A,C}
A,Γ ⊢ ∆, B Γ ⊢ ∆, A, C
→/r
Γ ⊢ ∆, A→ B/C
(if then else)
(¬A ∨ ¬B) ∧ (A ∨ ¬C)
{A,B ⊢;C ⊢ A}
A,B,Γ ⊢ ∆ C,Γ ⊢ ∆, A
→/l
A→ B/C,Γ ⊢ ∆
contraction, exchange, cut), and initial sequents A ⊢ A is the classical sequent
calculus LX for those connectives and rules.
Proposition 1. LX with rule pairs for each connective as defined above is
sound and complete.
Proof. Soundness by a standard inductive proof, completeness by the usual
construction of a countermodel from a failed search for a cut-free proof. See
Theorem 3.2 of Baaz, Fermu¨ller, and Zach [1994] for details. (Note that this
proof yields completeness without the cut rule.) ⊣
When comparing the systems LX with natural deduction systems, it will be
useful to start from a slight variant of LX in which the side formulas are not
required to be identical in the premises. We replace an LX rule
Π1,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λ1 . . . Πn,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λn
⊛r
Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛( ~A)
by
Π1,Γ1 ⊢ ∆1,Λ1 . . . Πn,Γn ⊢ ∆n,Λn
⊛rc
Γ1, . . . ,Γn ⊢ ∆1, . . . ,∆n,⊛( ~A)
to obtain the sequent calculus with independent contexts LcX.
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Proposition 2. LX and LcX are equivalent.
Proof. A proof in LX can be translated into one in LcX by adding con-
tractions (and exchanges), one in LcX can be translated into a proof in LX by
adding weakenings (and exchanges). ⊣
§3. Splitting rules. The sequent calculi usually considered differ from the
calculi LX as constructed above in that some of the rules are “split.” This
is the case in particular for the ∨r rule in LK. In this case, we replace the
single rule with premise clause ⊢ A,B by two rules, each with a single premise
⊢ A or ⊢ B. The availability of split rules is crucial if one wants to consider a
variant of the sequent calculus with one side restricted to at most one formula,
and when considering natural deduction systems, where the conclusion is also
likewise restricted to a single formula. In such systems, we need rules where the
premises satisfy the restriction as well.
Suppose we have a rule for ⊛ with premise set corresponding to a set of
clauses C, and let C ∈ C be the clause corresponding to a single premise of
the rule. We can partition the clause C into two parts: C = C1 ∪ C2, where
C2 = {L1, . . . , Lk} and consider the clause sets Ci = (C \ {C}) ∪ {C1 ∪ {Li}}.
We can then consider the variant calculus LX∗ with the rule corresponding to C
replaced by the rules corresponding to all the Ci.
Proposition 3. LX and LX∗ are equivalent.
Proof. We just have to show that an inference based on the rule for C can
be simulated by the rules for Ci and conversely. An inference using Ci can be
simulated by an inference based on C by weakening the premise corresponding
to C1 ∪ {Li} with the rest of C2. In the other direction, an inference based on C
can be simulated by repeated application of Ci and contracting multiple copies
of ⊛(A1, . . . , An) in the resulting conclusion sequent. ⊣
For instance, in the case of ∨r, the constructed rule with premise clause C =
⊢ A,B can be replaced with the two ∨r rules with premises ⊢ A and ⊢ B (here
C1 = ∅ and C2 = {A,B}). An inference using ∨r1 with premise Γ ⊢ ∆, A can
be replaced by
Γ ⊢ ∆, A
wr
Γ ⊢ ∆, A,B
∨r
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∨B
An inference using ∨r can be replaced by a proof segment using ∨r1 and ∨r2:
Γ ⊢ ∆, A,B
∨r2
Γ ⊢ ∆, A,A ∨B
xr
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∨B,A
∨r1
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∨B,A ∨B
cr
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∨B
We thus have:
Proposition 4. If LX∗ is obtained from LX by splitting a rule, it is sound
and complete iff LX is.
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Corollary 5. If LX is sound and complete, there is a sound and complete
LX∗ in which every premise of every rule has at most one auxiliary formula on
the right.
Proof. By successively replacing every rule in which some premise contains
more than one auxiliary formula on the right by the split rules where C2 contains
all the positive clauses of the corresponding premise clause. ⊣
Note that this result does not establish that the calculus obtained from LX∗
by restricting all sequents to at most one formula on the right proves the same
(restricted) sequents as LX. It only shows that for every LX there is at least a
candidate calculus LX∗ where such a restriction would be possible as far as the
logical rules are concerned. The resulting calculus may have different provable
sequents. The example of LK and LJ illustrates this.
The set of rules obtained by splitting a rule of LX more than once may result
in redundant rules, e.g., those where a premise contains an auxiliary formula A
on the left and another premise contains it on the right. For instance, consider
the ⊕r rule from Table 2. Fully splitting the rule would result in four rules:
Γ ⊢ ∆, A B,Γ ⊢ ∆
⊕r1
Γ ⊢ ∆, A⊕B
Γ ⊢ ∆, B A,Γ ⊢ ∆
⊕r2
Γ ⊢ ∆, A⊕B
Γ ⊢ ∆, A A,Γ ⊢ ∆
⊕r3
Γ ⊢ ∆, A⊕B
Γ ⊢ ∆, B B,Γ ⊢ ∆
⊕r4
Γ ⊢ ∆, A⊕B
The two bottom rules are superfluous: the un-split rule can be simulated using
the other two (and contractions):
Γ ⊢ ∆, A,B
A ⊢ A
A,Γ ⊢ ∆, A
⊕r2
Γ ⊢ ∆, A,A⊕B
Γ ⊢ ∆, A⊕B,A
B ⊢ B
B,Γ ⊢ ∆, B A,B,Γ ⊢ ∆
⊕r2
B,Γ ⊢ ∆, A⊕B
⊕r1
Γ ⊢ ∆, A⊕B,A⊕B
cr
Γ ⊢ ∆, A⊕B
Corollary 6. If LX is sound and complete, there is a sound and complete
LX∗∗ in which every premise of every rule has at most one auxiliary formula.
LX∗∗ is a calculus with “fully split” rules. In this case, each premise of a rule
corresponds to a single literal (positive if the auxiliary formula appears on the
right, negative if on the left). A rule then corresponds to a conjunction of literals,
and a set of ⊛r rules to a dnf of ⊛(A1, . . . , An) in the atomic formulas Ai.
Starting from a single ⊛r rule corresponding to a cnf, the fully split set of rules
corresponds to converting the cnf to a dnf by distributing ∧ over ∨. The fully
split rules have the interesting property that when applied to initial sequents
they derive the sequent Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛(A1, . . . , An) where Γ contains Ai iff Ai appears
as an auxiliary formula on the right, and ∆ contains Ai iff Ai appears as an
auxiliary formula on the left. If ¬ is present, we even get a derivation, using
only ¬l and ⊛r, of Π ⊢ ⊛( ~A) (which moreover does not contain more than one
formula on the right), where Π = Γ,¬∆. The set of all Π so obtained exactly
describes the truth value assignments under which ⊛( ~A) is true.
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Table 3. Split rules for some unusual connectives
connective rules
A 9 B
A,Γ ⊢ ∆
9l1
A 9 B,Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, B
9l2
A 9 B,Γ ⊢ ∆
A | B
A,Γ ⊢ ∆
|r1
Γ ⊢ ∆, A | B
B,Γ ⊢ ∆
|r2
Γ ⊢ ∆, A | B
A ↓ B
Γ ⊢ ∆, A
↓l1
A ↓ B,Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, B
↓l2
A ↓ B,Γ ⊢ ∆
A⊕B
Γ ⊢ ∆, A B,Γ ⊢ ∆
⊕r1
Γ ⊢ ∆, A⊕B
Γ ⊢ ∆, B A,Γ ⊢ ∆
⊕r2
Γ ⊢ ∆, A⊕B
A,Γ ⊢ ∆ B,Γ ⊢ ∆
⊕l1
A⊕B,Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, B Γ ⊢ ∆, A
⊕l2
A⊕B,Γ ⊢ ∆
A→ B/C
A,Γ ⊢ ∆, B Γ ⊢ ∆, A
→/r1
Γ ⊢ ∆, A→ B/C
A,Γ ⊢ ∆, B Γ ⊢ ∆, C
→/r2
Γ ⊢ ∆, A→ B/C
A,B,Γ ⊢ ∆ Γ ⊢ ∆, A
→/l1
A→ B/C,Γ ⊢ ∆
A,B,Γ ⊢ ∆ C,Γ ⊢ ∆
→/l2
A→ B/C,Γ ⊢ ∆
Suppose now we have a sequent calculus with the usual structural rules but
only right rules for a connective ⊛. We can determine sound and complete left
rules for ⊛ by reverse engineering the rules given. Each ⊛r rule determines a set
of clauses, which is equivalent to a conjunctive normal form for ⊛(A1, . . . , An)
in the arguments Ai, . . . , An. If we have more than one ⊛r rule, consider the
disjunction of the corresponding cnfs. Its negation also has a cnf, which yields
an ⊛l rule which together with the ⊛r rules is sound and complete, as is the
calculus resulting from the given ⊛r rules together with any rules obtained from
⊛l by splitting.
§4. Multi-conclusion natural deduction rules. A sequent calculus LX is
straightforwardly and systematically related to a sequence-conclusion “sequent-
style” natural deduction calculus NsmX as follows. In N
s
mX, the antecedent
of a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is a multiset, not a sequence as in LX. The axioms of
NsmX are initial sequents A ⊢ A. Every ⊛r rule is also a rule in N
s
mX, an
introduction rule for ⊛. Every ⊛l rule corresponds to a general elimination
rule with the same premises as ⊛l (the minor premises), an additional premise
Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛(A1, . . . , An) (the major premise) and the conclusion Γ ⊢ ∆, where
Γ and ∆ are the same schematic context formulas as in the premises. As an
example, consider the conditional, →. cnfs for A→ B and ¬(A→ B) are
A→ B iff ¬A ∨B
¬(A→ B) iff A ∧ ¬B
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These correspond to the introduction and elimination rules
A,Γ ⊢ ∆, B
→i
Γ ⊢ ∆, A→ B
Γ ⊢ ∆, A→ B Γ ⊢ ∆, A B,Γ ⊢ ∆
→e
Γ ⊢ ∆
The formulas in the antecedent of a sequent in an NsmX derivation are called
open assumptions. If a schematic variable A occurs in the antecedent of a premise
in an elimination rule, it does not occur in the antecedent of the conclusion: the
open assumption A is then said to be discharged by the rule.
Any proof in LX can be translated into a proof in NsmX. A ⊛l infer-
ence translates into a ⊛e inference with major premise ⊛(A1, . . . , An),Γ ⊢
∆,⊛(A1, . . . , An). This premise itself can be derived from ⊛(A1, . . . , An) ⊢
⊛(A1, . . . , An) by weakening and exchanges alone. Conversely, any proof in
NsmX can be translated into an LX proof. An ⊛e inference is translated into
a ⊛l inference (with the minor premises as premises of the rule), followed by a
cut with the proof ending in the major premise.
The sequent-style natural deduction calculus NsmX corresponds to a natural
deduction system in which proofs are trees of sequences of formulas.1 Whenever
there is a derivation of ∆ from undischarged assumptions Γ there is a derivation
of Γ ⊢ ∆ in NsmX. Conversely, if N
s
mX proves Γ ⊢ ∆ then there is a derivation
in NmX of Γ
′ ⊢ ∆ with Γ′ ⊆ Γ. (Note that in natural deduction there is no
equivalent to the left weakening rule, hence in general we can only get Γ′ ⊆ Γ).
In the context of natural deductions (especially when considering the Curry-
Howard isomorphism) it is often necessary and helpful to consider a version of
natural deduction in which one has more control over which elimination infer-
ences discharge which assumptions, and to have book-keeping information for
this in the derivations themselves. A corresponding sequent-style natural deduc-
tion calculus then will have labels on the formulas occurring in the antecedent
(the assumptions), and the antecedent is now considered a set, not a multi-set,
of labelled formulas. The antecedent of a sequent is also often called the context.
The wl and cl rules are removed. Since the contexts are sets, contraction on
the left is implicit. For simplicity we will also consider the consequent to be a
multi-set of formulas (i.e., exchanges are implicit and the xr rule is removed). In
order to make the comparison with type systems easier, we will use variables x as
these labels, and write a labelled assumption formula as x : A. An initial sequent
1Such a system was first introduced by von Kutschera [1962], for a language with Sheffer
stroke and universal quantifier as the only primitives; he did not investigate normal forms.
Boricˇic´ [1985] gave a system for the usual primitives and provided explicit translations from
and to the sequent calculus and a normal form theorem. Baaz, Fermu¨ller, and Zach [1993] inde-
pendently obtained generalized results of the same type for arbitrary n-valued connectives and
quantifiers. Cellucci [1992] proved normalization for a classical system including the ε-operator.
Parigot [1992b] gave a system in which conclusions are sets of “named” formulas, and proved
strong normalization using the λµ-calculus. The system is related to the multiple-conclusion
calculi of Shoesmith and Smiley [1978], although their proofs have a different structure. In
their systems, proofs are graphs of formulas, and a rule may have more than one conclusion
formula, resulting in proofs that are not trees. Our system has trees of sequents with more than
one formula in the succedent, but naturally yields a system of trees of sequences or multi-sets
of formulas, and every rule has a single sequence or multi-set of formulas as conclusion.
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then is a sequent of the form
x : A ⊢ A
We replace the introduction and elimination rules by rules in which the side
formulas are not required to be shared. In other words, we replace a rule
. . . Πi,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λi . . .
⊛i
Γ ⊢ ∆
by
. . . Πi,Γi ⊢ ∆i,Λi . . .
⊛i
Γ1, . . . ,Γn ⊢ ∆1, . . . ,∆n
Since the wl rule is removed, we must allow vacuous discharge of assumptions:
a rule application is correct even if the discharged assumptions do not all appear
in the premises. In other words, an application of a logical rule
Γ0 ⊢ ∆,⊛( ~A) Π1,Γ1 ⊢ ∆1,Λ1 . . . Πn,Γn ⊢ ∆n,Λn
⊛e : l
Γ0, . . . ,Γn ⊢ ∆1, . . . ,∆n
may discharge any number of assumptions mentioned in the schematic form of
the rule, including zero. The labels of assumptions discharged in an application
are listed with the rule. Formulas instantiating the same schematic variable must
have the same label. For instance, the →e rule now becomes:
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A→ B Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, A x : B,Γ2 ⊢ ∆2
→e : x
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ ∆0,∆1,∆2
A correct derivation is a tree of sequents starting in initial sequents in which
every inference is correct according to the new definition. We denote the new
system NlmX.
Lemma 7. In any derivation δ in NlmX, we can replace a label x uniformly by
another label y not already used in the derivation, and obtain a correct deriva-
tion δ[y/x].
Proof. By induction on the height of the derivation. ⊣
Proposition 8. If δ is an NlmX derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆, there is a derivation
in NsmX of Γ
′ ⊢ ∆ where Γ′ is Γ with labels removed.
Proof. By induction on the height of δ. Simply remove labels, adding cl,
xl, and xr inferences where required. For each inference in δ in which not all
labelled formulas x : A are discharged, add a wl inference to the corresponding
premise before applying the rule. ⊣
Proposition 9. If δ is an NsmX derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆, there is a derivation δ
′
in NlmX of Γ
′ ⊢ ∆ where if x : A is a labelled occurrence of A in Γ′, Γ contains A.
Proof. In a first pass, we assign sets of labels to the formulas in the contexts
in δ inductively:
If A ⊢ A is an initial sequent, replace it with {x} : A ⊢ A for some label x.
If A is the weakened formula in a wl inference, assign ∅ to it.
If label sets l1,and l2, both 6= ∅, have been assigned to the auxiliary formulas
A,A in a cl inference, replace every label set l1 and l2 in the derivation ending
in the premise by the set l1 ∪ l2 and assign l1 ∪ l2 to A in the conclusion.
In all other inferences, first uniformly replace labels throughout the deriva-
tions ending in the premises to ensure that the label sets appearing in any two
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Table 4. Multi-conclusion natural deduction rules for some un-
usual connectives
connective intro/elim rule
A 9 B
Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, A B,Γ2 ⊢ ∆2
9i
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ ∆1,∆2, A 9 B
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A 9 B A,Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, B
9e
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ ∆0,∆1
A | B
A,B,Γ1 ⊢ ∆1
|i
Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, A | B
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A | B Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, A Γ2 ⊢ ∆2, B
|e
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ ∆0,∆1,∆2
A ↓ B
A,Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 B,Γ2 ⊢ ∆2
↓i
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ ∆1,∆2, A ↓ B
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A ↓ B Γ1 ⊢ ∆2, A,B
↓e
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ ∆0,∆1
A⊕B
Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, A,B A,B,Γ2 ⊢ ∆2
⊕i
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ ∆1,∆2, A⊕B
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A⊕B A,Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, B B,Γ2 ⊢ ∆2, A
⊕e
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ ∆0,∆1,∆2
A→ B/C
A,Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, B Γ2 ⊢ ∆2, A, C
→/i
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ ∆1,∆2, A→ B/C
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A→ B/C A,B,Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 C,Γ2 ⊢ ∆2, A
→/e
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ ∆0,∆1,∆2
derivations are disjoint. Then assign the same label sets to the formulas in the
conclusion as the corresponding formulas in the premises.
If l, l′ are two different label sets in the result, l ∩ l′ = ∅. We may assume
that the labels xi are linearly ordered; let min(l) be the least label in l in this
ordering.
We define the translation by induction on the height of the labelled deriva-
tion δ. The translation has the following property: if the labelled δ ends in
Γ ⊢ ∆ and its translation δ′ ends in Γ′ ⊢ ∆′, then (a) if l : A ∈ Γ with l 6= ∅, then
min(l) : A ∈ Γ′, and (b) if x : A ∈ Γ′ then for some l, l : A ∈ Γ with x = min(l),
and (c) Γ′ contains each x : A at most once. In each step below, it is easily
verified that (a), (b), and (c) hold.
If δ is just an initial sequent l : A ⊢ A, δ′ is min(l) : A ⊢ A.
If δ ends in a wr, cr, or cut inference, apply wr, cr, or cut, respectively,
to the translation of the premise.
If δ ends in xr, or in a wl or cl inference with principal or weakened formula
l : A, δ′ is the translation of its premise (i.e., we remove left weakenings and
contractions). In the case of cl, by induction hypothesis, the antecedent of the
translation of the premise already contains min(l) : A at most once.
12 RICHARD ZACH
Suppose δ ends in a logical inference,
Γ0 ⊢ ∆,⊛( ~A) Π1,Γ1 ⊢ ∆1,Λ1 . . . Πn,Γn ⊢ ∆n,Λn
⊛e
Γ0,Γ1, . . . ,Γn ⊢ ∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆n
Let δ′i be the translations of the derivations ending in the premises. Each δ
′
i
proves Π′i,Γ
′
i ⊢ ∆i,Λi where Π
′
i is a set of labelled formulas. For each l : A ∈ Πi,
min(l) : A ∈ Π′i iff l 6= ∅, and if x : A ∈ Π
′
i then x = min(l). If different labelled
formulas l : A and l′ : A appear in Πi and Πj but instantiate the same schematic
formula of the rule, then min(l) : A and min(l′) : A appear in Π′i and Π
′
j . Replace
min(l′) : A in the entire derivation δ′j ending in the second premise by min(l) : A
everywhere it occurs. In this way we obtain δ′′i in which labelled formulas x : A
which instantiate the same schematic variable have the same label. Adding ⊛e
to the resulting δ′′i results in a correct inference, if we label the inference with
the list of labels appearing in the Πi. Note that when ⊛e discharges a formula
A which is obtained by weakening, it was originally labelled by ∅. It either still
was labelled with ∅ at the end, or its label set was combined with that of another
occurrence of A with which it was later contracted. In the first case it no longer
appears in the premise of the translated derivation, the corresponding inference
thus vacuously discharges A.
The case of ⊛i is treated the same way. ⊣
§5. Specialized elimination rules. In order to get the familiar elimination
rules for natural deduction, the general elimination rules obtained from the ⊛l
rule must be simplified. For instance, the general elimination rule for → based
on →l is
Γ ⊢ ∆, A→ B Γ ⊢ ∆, A B,Γ ⊢ ∆
→e
Γ ⊢ ∆
We can obtain a specialized rule by removing a premise which only discharges a
single assumption, and instead add the discharged assumption to the conclusion.
In the case of→, for instance, we observe that if B ∈ ∆, the right minor premise
B,Γ ⊢ ∆ contains the initial sequent B ⊢ B as a subsequent and is thus always
derivable. The additional formula B is then of course also part of ∆ in the
conclusion. The simplified rule →e′ is the familiar modus ponens rule:
Γ ⊢ ∆, A→ B Γ ⊢ ∆, A
→e′
Γ ⊢ ∆, B
In general, a premise of ⊛e of the form Ai,Γ ⊢ ∆ can be removed while
Ai is added to the right side of the conclusion to obtain a simplified rule ⊛e
′.
For if Π,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λ is derivable (the general form of any of the premises), so
is Π,Γ ⊢ ∆, Ai,Λ by wr and xr. The sequent corresponding to the removed
premise is Ai,Γ ⊢ ∆, Ai which is derivable from the initial sequent Ai ⊢ Ai by
weakenings and exchanges alone. E.g.,
Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛(A1, . . . , An) · · · Πi,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λi · · ·
⊛e′
Γ ⊢ ∆, Ai
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turns into
Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛(A1, . . . , An)
Γ ⊢ ∆, Ai,⊛(A1, . . . , An) . . .
Πi,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λi
Πi,Γ ⊢ ∆, Ai,Λi . . . . . .
Ai ⊢ Ai
Ai,Γ ⊢ ∆, Ai
⊛e
Γ ⊢ ∆, Ai
Thus, any inference using the specialized rule ⊛e′ can be replaced by the orig-
inal rule ⊛e. Conversely, if the premises of the original rule are derivable, the
specialized rule applied to the premises still present in the specialized rule proves
Γ ⊢ ∆, Ai. The removed premise of the original rule is Ai,Γ ⊢ ∆. Using cut
and contraction, we obtain a derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆. E.g.,
Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛(A1, . . . , An) · · · Πi,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λi · · · Ai,Γ ⊢ ∆
⊛e
Γ ⊢ ∆
turns into
Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛(A1, . . . , An) · · · Πi,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λi · · ·
⊛e′
Γ ⊢ ∆, Ai Ai,Γ ⊢ ∆
cut
Γ,Γ ⊢ ∆,∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
Since we allow multiple formulas in the succedent, this generalizes to mul-
tiple premises that only discharge single assumptions. For instance, we can
simplify ∨e
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∨B A,Γ ⊢ ∆ B,Γ ⊢ ∆
∨e
Γ ⊢ ∆
to get
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∨B
∨e′
Γ ⊢ ∆, A,B
Note that the simulation of the original general rule by the specialized elimination
rule requires a cut. It should thus not surprise that general elimination rules are
proof-theoretically better behaved than the specialized rules.
It is also possible using the same idea to specialize rules by removing premises
which only contain a single formula in the succedent. In that case, the corre-
sponding formula must be added to the antecedent of the conclusion. Here is an
example. The general |e rule
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A | B Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, A Γ2 ⊢ ∆2, B
|e
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ ∆0,∆1,∆2
specializes to the two rules
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A | B Γ2 ⊢ ∆2, B
|e′1A,Γ0,Γ2 ⊢ ∆0,∆2
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A | B Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, A
|e′2B,Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ ∆0,∆1
and further to the single rule
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A | B
|e′
A,B,Γ0 ⊢ ∆0
Sequent-style natural deduction is closely connected to standard natural de-
duction, in which assumptions are not collected in the antecedent of a sequent
but are simply formulas at the top of a proof tree, possibly marked as discharged.
In the standard formalism, such a specialized rule is difficult to accommodate,
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Table 5. Some specialized and split elimination rules for some
unusual connectives
connective intro/elim rule
A 9 B
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A 9 B Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, B
9e1
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ ∆0,∆1
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A 9 B
9e2
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A
A⊕B
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A⊕B ⊕e1
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A,B
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A⊕B Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, B Γ2 ⊢ ∆2, A ⊕e2
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ ∆0,∆1,∆2
A→ B/C
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A→ B/C C,Γ2 ⊢ ∆2, A
→/e1
Γ0,Γ2 ⊢ ∆0,∆2, B
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A→ B/C A,Γ1 ⊢ ∆1
→/e2
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ ∆0,∆1, C
since it would amount to a rule that allows one to add undischarged assumptions
to the proof tree which don’t already occur in the tree.
The restriction to a single formula in the antecedent of the specialized premise
is essential. We cannot specialize a rule by removing a premise which discharges
two assumptions by putting both assumptions into the succedent of the conclu-
sion. The reason is that from the conclusion Γ ⊢ ∆, Ai, Aj we cannot recover
Γ ⊢ ∆ by cuts together with the removed premise Ai, Aj ,Γ ⊢ ∆. We can,
however, replace the rule by a set of specialized rules, one for each assumption
formula discharged in the specialized premise. This corresponds exactly to first
splitting the ⊛l rule, considering the generalized ⊛e rules based on these split
rules, and then specializing the resulting rules as before. Consider for example
the rules for ∧. The standard ∧l rule has the single premise A,B,Γ ⊢ ∆. It
corresponds to the general elimination rule
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∧B A,B,Γ ⊢ ∆
∧e
Γ ⊢ ∆
The rule ∧l can be split into two ∧l rules with premises A,Γ ⊢ ∆ and B,Γ ⊢ ∆,
respectively. The corresponding general ∧e rules are
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∧B A,Γ ⊢ ∆
∧e1
Γ ⊢ ∆
and
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∧B B,Γ ⊢ ∆
∧e2
Γ ⊢ ∆
which can be specialized to the familiar two ∧ elimination rules:
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∧B
∧e′1Γ ⊢ ∆, A
and
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∧B
∧e′2Γ ⊢ ∆, B
It is possible to generate a general elimination rule from a specialized one by
reverse-engineering the specialization process. Suppose we have a specialized
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rule ⊛e′:
Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛( ~A) · · · Πi,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λi · · ·
⊛e′
Γ ⊢ ∆, Ai
Then the corresponding general elimination rule has the same premises as ⊛e′
plus an additional premise Ai,Γ ⊢ ∆, and the conclusion leaves out the Ai:
Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛( ~A) · · · Πi,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λi · · · Ai,Γ ⊢ ∆
⊛e
Γ ⊢ ∆
Since ⊛e′ is the result of ⊛e specialized in the premise Ai,Γ ⊢ ∆, the two rules
are equivalent.
§6. Cut elimination and substitution. Gentzen’s cut elimination method
proceeds by permuting inference rules with the cut rule until there is a topmost
cut where the cut formula is introduced in both premises of the cut by a right
and a left inference, respectively. Such topmost cuts can then be reduced to cuts
with cut formulas of a lower degree. We’ll now show that the fact that this is
possible is no accident; in fact it holds whenever we have a calculus obtained
by our procedure. The key fact here is that the original clause sets C(⊛)+ and
C(⊛)− are not jointly satisfiable. As an unsatisfiable clause set it has a resolution
refutation, which can be immediately translated into a derivation of the empty
sequent from the sequents corresponding to the clauses in C(⊛)+ ∪ C(⊛)−.
The same is true for clause sets corresponding to split rules, since each clause
in them is a subset of a clause in C(⊛)+ ∪ C(⊛)−.
Theorem 10. The cut elimination theorem holds for LX.
Proof. For a detailed proof, see Theorem 4.1 of Baaz, Fermu¨ller, and Zach
[1994]. We give a sketch only. As in Gentzen [1934], we observe that the cut
rule is equivalent to the mix rule,
Γ ⊢ ∆ Θ ⊢ Ξ
mix : A
Γ,Λ∗ ⊢ Θ∗,Ξ
where ∆∗ and Θ∗ are ∆ and Ξ, respectively, with every occurrence of the mix
formula A removed. We show that a proof with a single mix inference as its last
inference can be transformed into one without mix. The result then follows by
induction on the number of applications of mix in the proof.
We introduce two measures on proofs ending in a single mix: The degree is
the degree of the mix formula A. The left rank is the maximum number of
consecutive sequents on a branch ending in the left premise that contains the
mix formula A on the right, counting from the left premise; and similarly for the
right rank. The rank of the mix is the sum of the left and right rank. The proof
then proceeds by double induction on the rank and degree. We distinguish cases
according to the inferences ending in the premises of the mix inference and show
how, in every case, either that the degree of the mix can be reduced, or else that
there is a proof using a mix of the same degree but of lower rank.
The first case occurs when the mix formula A appears only once in ∆ and Θ
and as the principal formula of a ⊛r inference that ends in the left premise Γ ⊢ ∆
and of a ⊛l inference that ends in the right premise Θ ⊢ Ξ. In all other cases,
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the mix inference is switched with the last inference on the left or right side,
thus reducing the rank.
In the critical first case, the proof ends in
· · · Πi,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λi · · ·
⊛r
Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛( ~A)
· · · Π′i,Θ ⊢ Ξ,Λ
′
i · · ·
⊛l
⊛( ~A),Θ ⊢ Ξ
mix : ⊛( ~A)
Γ,Θ ⊢ ∆,Ξ
Remove the side formulas Γ, ∆, Θ, Ξ from the premises and consider the set of se-
quents Πi ⊢ Λi and Π′i ⊢ Λ
′
i. These are just the clauses C(⊛)
+ and C(⊛)−, which
together form an unsatisfiable set of Kowalski clauses. A resolution refutation
of this clause set yields a derivation of the empty sequent from these sequents
using only mix inferences on the Ai. This derivation in turn, by adding the side
formulas Γ, ∆, Θ, Ξ appropriately, and adding some exchanges and contractions
at the end, yields a derivation of the sequent Γ,Θ ⊢ ∆,Ξ. The remaining mix
inferences are all of lower degree, and so the induction hypothesis applies.
In the other cases we show that the end-sequent has a cut-free derivation
by appealing to the second clause of the induction hypothesis, namely, that
proofs ending in mix inferences of lower rank can be transformed into mix-free
proofs. For instance, suppose the right premise ends in ⊛l but its principal
formula ⊛( ~A) is not the only occurrence of the mix formula in the antecedent of
the right premise:
Γ ⊢ ∆
· · · Π′i,Θ ⊢ Ξ,Λ
′
i · · ·
⊛l
⊛( ~A),Θ ⊢ Ξ
mix : ⊛( ~A)
Γ,Θ∗ ⊢ ∆∗,Ξ
We may assume that the mix formula ⊛( ~A) does not occur in Γ, since otherwise
we can obtain a mix-free proof of the end-sequent from the right premise of the
mix using only weakening and exchanges.
If we now apply mix to the left premise and to each of the premises of the ⊛l
inference directly we have:
Γ ⊢ ∆ Π′i,Θ ⊢ Ξ,Λ
′
i
mix : ⊛( ~A)
Γ,Π′i,Θ
∗ ⊢ ∆∗,Ξ,Λ′i
Since the subproof leading to the premise on the right no longer contains the
⊛l inference, the right rank is reduced by 1, and so the induction hypothesis
applies. Each of these derivations can be transformed into a mix-free derivation.
We can apply ⊛l and mix again:
Γ ⊢ ∆
· · ·
Γ,Π′i,Θ
∗ ⊢ ∆∗,Ξ,Λ′i
xl
Π′i,Γ,Θ
∗ ⊢ ∆∗,Ξ,Λ′i · · ·
⊛l
⊛( ~A),Γ,Θ∗ ⊢ ∆∗,Ξ
mix : ⊛( ~A)
Γ,Γ,Θ∗ ⊢ ∆∗,∆∗,Ξ
The right rank of this mix is 1 since ⊛( ~A) does not occur in Π′i,Γ,Θ
∗, so the
rank is lower than that of the original mix and the induction hypothesis again
applies: Γ,Γ,Θ∗ ⊢ ∆∗,∆∗,Ξ has a proof without mix. We can obtain the
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original end-sequent Γ,Θ∗ ⊢ ∆∗,Ξ from Γ,Γ,Θ∗ ⊢ ∆∗,∆∗,Ξ by exchanges and
contractions. ⊣
To illustrate the use of resolution refutations in the first case, consider a proof
that ends in
Γ ⊢ ∆, A Γ ⊢ ∆, B
∧r
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∧B
A,B,Θ ⊢ Ξ
∧l
A ∧B,Θ ⊢ Ξ
mix : A ∧B
Γ,Θ ⊢ ∆,Ξ
The corresponding set of Kowalski clauses is
⊢ A, ⊢ B, A,B ⊢
(i.e., {A}, {B}, {¬A,¬B}). A resolution refutation is
⊢ B
⊢ A A,B ⊢
B ⊢
⊢
to which we add the side formulas appropriately, and exchanges and contraction
inferences at the end, to obtain:
Γ ⊢ ∆, B
Γ ⊢ ∆, A A,B,Θ ⊢ Ξ
mix
Γ, B,Θ ⊢ ∆,Ξ
mix
Γ,Γ,Θ ⊢ ∆,∆,Ξ
Γ,Θ ⊢ ∆,Ξ
In the natural deduction system NsmX, the cut rule can also be eliminated. In
this case, however, the proof is much simpler than for LX. In fact, in NsmX the
cut rule simply corresponds to substituting derivations for assumptions. Since
NsmX has no rules which introduce a formula in the antecedent of a sequent in a
derivation, every formula in the antecedent is either weakened, or it stems from
an initial sequent. Whenever it is weakened, we can derive the conclusion of the
cut inference from the premise of the weakening inference already. If it stems
from an initial sequent, we can replace the initial sequent by the derivation
ending in the left premise, and adding the context formulas Γ and ∆ to the
antecedent and succedent of every inference below it, adjusting any inferences
with weakenings as necessary.
Suppose δ is a derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆, A and δ′ is a derivation of A,Π ⊢ Λ,
and suppose that neither δ nor δ′ contains a cut. We can define the substitu-
tion δ′[δ/A] with end sequent Π,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λ recursively as follows. We distinguish
cases according to the last inference of δ′:
1. δ′ is an initial sequent A ⊢ A. Then Π = ∅, Λ = A, and δ′[δ/A] is δ.
2. δ′ is an initial sequent B ⊢ B, but B 6= A. Then δ′[δ/A] is
B ⊢ B
B,Γ ⊢ ∆, B
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3. δ′ ends in a wl. The weakening formula is A, and the deduction ending in
the premise is δ′′ : Π ⊢ Λ. Let δ′[δ/A] be
δ′′
Π ⊢ Λ
Π,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λ
4. δ′ ends in any other rule: Then δ′[δ/A] is obtained by substituting δ for A in
each of the premises, and then applying the same rule. It is straightforward
to verify that the result is a correct derivation of Π,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λ. Note in
particular that in none of the remaining rules of NsmX can A be a principal
formula in the antecedent.
Proposition 11. The cut rule can be eliminated from derivations in NsmX.
Proof. By induction on the number of cut inferences in a derivation δ. If
there are no cuts in δ, there is nothing to prove. Suppose δ contains a cut
inference; pick an uppermost one. Replace the subderivation
δ′
Γ ⊢ ∆, A
δ′′
A,Π ⊢ Λ
cut
Γ,Π ⊢ ∆,Λ
by
δ′′[δ′/A]
Π,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λ
Γ,Π ⊢ ∆,Λ ⊣
Substitutions can similarly be defined for NlmX, the variant of N
s
mX with-
out left weakening and contraction in which antecedent formulas are labelled.
Suppose δ and δ′ are NlmX derivations without labels in common, without cut,
and δ ends in Γ ⊢ ∆, A and δ′ ends in x : A,Π ⊢ Λ. We define a substituted
translation δ′[δ/x : A] of Γ′,Π ⊢ ∆,Λ with Γ′ ⊆ Γ.
1. δ′ is an initial sequent x : A ⊢ A. Then Λ = {A}. Let δ′[δ/x : A] be δ plus
wr to obtain a derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆, A.
2. δ′ is an initial sequent y : B ⊢ B, but B 6= A or x 6= y. Then δ′[δ/A] is δ′
plus wr to obtain a derivation of Π ⊢ ∆, B.
3. δ′ ends in any other rule: Then δ′[δ/x : A] is obtained by substituting δ for
x : A in each of the premises, and then applying the same rule. If the rule
discharged an assumption x : A no longer present in the antecedent of the
respective substituted premise, in the resulting inference the corresponding
discharge is vacuous and the label y removed from the list of discharged
labels.
It is straightforward to verify that the result is a correct derivation of Γ′,Π ⊢
∆,Λ.
Proposition 12. The cut rule can be eliminated from derivations in NlmX.
Proof. By renaming the labels, we can guarantee that the labels in the
derivation of the premises are disjoint. ⊣
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§7. Normalization for multi-conclusion natural deduction. The cut
elimination theorem in NsmX and N
l
mX is, as we have seen, simply the result
that derivations of a conclusion involving a formula A may be substituted for
assumptions of that formula. In the context of natural deduction, the more in-
teresting result is that every derivation reduces, via a sequence of local reduction
steps, to a normal form. A derivation is in normal form if it involves no “de-
tours,” i.e., no introductions of a formula by ⊛i followed by eliminations of the
same formula by ⊛e.
We prove the normalization result for NlmX without cut. Since conclusions
are now multi-sets of formulas, the situation vis-a`-vis detours in derivations is
more complicated than in the single-conclusion case. Specifically, in a single-
conclusion derivation any sequence of consecutive sequents beginning with an
⊛i and ending in an ⊛e inference is a “detour,” i.e., a maximum segment. No
two such segments can overlap, and the beginning and end of any segment is
uniquely determined. In the multi-conclusion case, segments can overlap, i.e.,
it is possible to have sequences of sequents in which a formula ⊛( ~A) is intro-
duced, then another ⊙( ~B) is introduced, then ⊛( ~A) is eliminated, and finally
⊙( ~B) is eliminated. The presence of the cr rule adds further complications:
a single ⊛e inference can count as the end-point of more than one maximum
segment.2 In order to deal with these complications, we must track the specific
formula occurrences introduced and later eliminated in the definition of maximal
segments.
Definition 13. A maximal segment in a cut-free derivation δ is a sequence
of sequents S1, . . . , Sk and of occurrences B1, . . . , Bk of ⊛( ~A) in the succedents
of S1, . . . , Sk, respectively, with the following properties.
1. S1 is the conclusion of a ⊛i or wr inference with principal formula B1 =
⊛( ~A).
2. Si is a premise of an inference, Si+1 its conclusion, and Bi+1 is the oc-
currence of ⊛( ~A) corresponding to Bi in Si. Specifically, Bi+1 is a side
formula if Bi is, or the principal formula of cr if Bi is one of the formula
occurrences being contracted.
3. Sk is the major premise of a ⊛e inference with principal formula occurrence
Bk = ⊛(A1, . . . , An).
A derivation is normal if it contains no maximal segments.
The formula ⊛( ~A) is the maximal formula of the segment. The degree of the
segment is the degree of ⊛( ~A), i.e., the number of logical operators in ⊛( ~A). The
length of the segment is k.
Note that although the principal formula of a ⊛e inference may be the last
formula occurrence of more than one maximal segment (if it passes through a cr
inference), any principal formula occurrence of ⊛i is the first formula of at most
one maximal segment. Since we are dealing with multisets of formulas, which
formula occurrence in the conclusion of a rule corresponds to which formula
occurrence in which premise is underdetermined. We could make this precise by
introducing labels or moving to a calculus of sequences in which it is determined;
2The proof of Cellucci [1992] does not consider this complication.
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for simplicity we assume that we have picked a way to associate corresponding
formula occurrences in the derivation we start from and keep this association the
same throughout the transformation.
Theorem 14. Any cut-free derivation in NlmX normalizes, i.e., there is a
sequence of local proof transformations which ends in a normal derivation.
Proof. Let m(δ) be the maximal degree of segments in δ, and let i(δ) be
the number of segments of maximal degree m(δ). We proceed by induction on
(m(δ), i(δ)).
We first ensure that at least one suitable segment of maximal degree is of
length 1. There must be a segment S1, . . . , Sk with maximal formula⊛(A1, . . . , An)
of degree m(δ) with the following properties. (a) No premise of the ⊛i or wr
rule with S1 as conclusion lies on or below a segment of degree m(δ). (b) No
minor premise of the ⊛e rule of which Sk is the major premise lies on or below a
segment of degreem(δ). If the length k = 1 we are done. Otherwise, we decrease
the length of this maximal segment.
We consider cases according to the rule of which Sk is the conclusion. Since
the segment is of length > 1, the formula occurrence Bk = ⊛( ~A) is not the
principal formula of an ⊛i or wr inference. In each remaining case, this last
inference and the following ⊛e inference can be permuted and the length of the
segment considered reduced.
1. The rule is wr, but Bk is not the weakened formula. Then replace the
inference
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0,⊛( ~A)
wr
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A,⊛( ~A) . . .
⊛e
. . .Γi . . . ⊢ . . .∆i . . . , A
by
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0,⊛( ~A) . . .
⊛e
. . .Γi . . . ⊢ . . .∆i . . .
wr
. . .Γi . . . ⊢ . . .∆i . . . , A
The length of any segment which ends with the ⊛e inference, and any
segment which begins with the wr inference have decreased, and others
are unchanged. No new maximal segments are added.
2. The rule is cr with the principal formula not Bk = ⊛( ~A). Then replace
the inferences
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A,A,⊛( ~A)
cr
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A,⊛( ~A) . . .
⊛e
. . .Γi . . . ⊢ . . .∆i . . . , A
by
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, A,A,⊛( ~A) . . .
⊛e
. . .Γi . . . ⊢ . . .∆i . . . , A,A
cr
. . .Γi . . . ⊢ . . .∆i . . . , A
3. The rule is cr and the principal formula is Bk = ⊛( ~A). The segment ends
in:
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0,
B′
k′−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
⊛( ~A),
Bk−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
⊛( ~A)
cr
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, B′k′ = Bk = ⊛(
~A) · · · Πi,Γi ⊢ ∆i,Λi · · ·
⊛e
. . .Γi . . . ⊢ . . .∆i . . .
where only one of the occurrences of ⊛( ~A) in the premise of cr is the
maximal formula occurrence Bk−1 of the segment. (The other occurrence
of ⊛( ~A) possibly belongs to another maximal segment ending in the ⊛e
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inference, say, it is B′k′−1 in some segment consisting of B
′
1, . . . , B
′
k′ .)
Replace these inferences by
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0,
B′
k′−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
⊛( ~A),
Bk−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
⊛( ~A) · · · Πi,Γi ⊢ ∆i,Λi · · ·
⊛e
. . .Γi . . . ⊢ . . .∆i, . . . , B′k′ = ⊛(
~A) · · · Πi,Γi ⊢ ∆i,Λi · · ·
⊛e
. . .Γi . . . ⊢ . . .∆i,∆i . . .
. . .Γi . . . ⊢ . . .∆i . . .
This changes maximal segments as follows: The segment under considera-
tion now ends at Bk−1, and has therefore decreased in length. Any segment
ending in the original ⊛e inference which contained the other contracted
formula occurrence B′k′−1 now ends at the lower ⊛e inference, and is of
the same length (k′) as before. Because of property (b) of the topmost seg-
ment under consideration, there are no segments of maximal degree passing
through or lying above the minor premises of the ⊛e rule, and so the du-
plication of the subproofs ending in these minor premises has no effect on
the number of segments of maximal degree.
4. The rule is a ⊙i rule, with a principal formula ⊙(~C), but the principal for-
mula ⊙(~C) is not Bk−1 = ⊛( ~A). Exactly one of the premises must belong
to the segment being considered, without loss of generality assume the first
is. Then that premise is of the form Π′1,Γ
′
1 ⊢ ∆
′
1, Bk−1 = ⊛( ~A),Λ1. Sup-
pose the other premises of the ⊙i inference are the sequents Π′j ,Γ
′
j ⊢ ∆
′
j ,Λ
′
j
(the formulas in Π′i and Λ
′
i are the auxiliary formulas). The conclusion of
the inference is Γ′1, . . . ,Γ
′
n ⊢ ∆
′
1, . . . ,∆
′
n, Bk = ⊛(
~A),⊙(~C).
Let Πi,Γi ⊢ ∆i,Λi be the minor premises of the ⊛e rule. If we let
Γ = Γ1, . . . ,Γn
Γ′ = Γ′1, . . . ,Γ
′
m
∆ = ∆1, . . . ,∆n
∆′ = ∆′1, . . . ,∆
′
m
the last inference in the segment has the following form:
Π′1,Γ
′
1 ⊢ ∆
′
1,
Bk−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
⊛( ~A),Λ′1 · · · Π
′
j ,Γ
′
j ⊢ ∆
′
j ,Λ
′
j · · ·
⊙i
Γ′ ⊢ ∆′, Bk = ⊛( ~A),⊙(~C) · · · Πi,Γi ⊢ ∆i,Λi · · ·
⊛e
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ ∆,∆′,⊙(~C)
where . . .Π′j ,Γ
′
j ⊢ ∆
′
j ,Λ
′
j . . . are the premises of the ⊙i inference other than
the first. Replace the inferences with
Π′1,Γ
′
1 ⊢ ∆
′
1,
Bk−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
⊛( ~A),Λ′1 · · · Πi,Γi ⊢ ∆i,Λi · · ·
⊛e
Π′1,Γ
′
1,Γ ⊢ ∆
′
1,∆,Λ
′
1 · · · Π
′
j ,Γ
′
j ⊢ ∆
′
j ,Λ
′
j · · ·
⊙i
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ ∆,∆′,⊙(~C)
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5. The last inference is ⊙E. This is treated as the previous one, except that
we now have to distinguish cases according to whether the segment runs
through the major premise or one of the minor premises. Again, since ⊛( ~A)
must occur in the context of one of the premises, the ⊛e rule can first be
applied to that premise, and the ⊙E rule then to its original premises, with
the one premise belonging to the segment replaced with the conclusion of
the ⊛e rule.
Now consider a topmost maximal segment of length 1. We have that S1 = Sk
is both the conclusion of a ⊛i or wr rule and the major premise of a ⊛e rule
with B1 = Bk the principal formula. In the second case, the segment in question
has the form
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0
wr
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0,⊛( ~A) . . . Πi,Γi ⊢ ∆i,Λi . . .
⊛e
Γ0, . . .Γi . . . ⊢ ∆0, . . .∆i . . .
This segment can be replaced by the premise of the wr rule followed by wr to
add the ∆i on the right:
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0
wr
Γ0 ⊢ ∆0, . . .∆i . . .
Any inferences below which discharge assumptions in Γ1, . . . , Γn are now vacu-
ous.
The first case is the crucial one. The segment is of the form
. . . Πi,Γi ⊢ ∆i,Λi . . .
⊛i
. . .Γi . . . ⊢ . . .∆i . . . ,⊛( ~A) . . . Π′j ,Γ
′
j ⊢ ∆
′
j ,Λ
′
j . . .
⊛e
. . .Γi . . .Γ
′
j . . . ⊢ . . .∆i . . .∆
′
j . . .
As in the cut elimination theorem, the premises Πi ⊢ Λi of the ⊛i rule together
with the minor premises Π′i ⊢ Λ
′
i of the ⊛e rule (with the context formulas Γi,
Γ′i, ∆i, ∆
′
i removed) form an unsatisfiable set of Kowalski clauses. A resolution
refutation of these clauses results in a derivation of the empty sequent ⊢. If any
literal is removed from such a derivation, the resolution refutation can be pruned
to yield a possible shorter refutation. For any assumption x : A not discharged by
the ⊛e and ⊛i rules, remove the corresponding negative literal from the initial
set of clauses and prune the refutation. (These cases correspond to what are
usually called simplification conversions.)
Now add the context formulas Γi, Γ
′
j , ∆i, ∆
′
j , to get a derivation of . . .Γi,Γ
′
i . . . ⊢
. . .∆i,∆j . . . from the premises of the ⊛i and the minor premises of the ⊛e rule
using cuts and structural rules only. We replace the maximal segment with this
derivation and eliminate the cuts.
Because the maximal segment beginning with ⊛i is topmost, and the deriva-
tions ending in the minor premises of ⊛e contain no segments of maximal degree,
the resulting derivation does not contain any new segments of maximal degree.
We have removed one segment of maximal degree. If the segment in question
was the only maximal segment of degree m(δ), the maximal degree of segments
in the resulting derivation is < m(δ). Otherwise, we have removed at least one
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maximal segment, and thus reduced the number of the segments of maximal de-
gree by 1. Thus, either the maximal degree of the resulting derivation is < m(δ)
(if the segment was the only segment of degree m(δ)), or the number of segments
of maximal degree in the resulting derivation is < i(δ). ⊣
To illustrate the differences to the case of normalization for single-conclusion
systems, consider the derivation fragment
⊢ A,B,C
∨i
⊢ A ∨Ba, C
⊢ D
wr
⊢ A ∨Bb, D
∧i
⊢ A ∨Ba, A ∨Bb, C ∧Dc
cr
⊢ A ∨Ba,b, C ∧Dc C,D ⊢ E
∧e
⊢ A ∨Ba,b, E A ⊢ F B ⊢ F
∨e
⊢ E,F
This derivation fragment contains three overlapping segments, the formulas la-
belled a, b, and c respectively. Assuming that A∨B and C ∧D are of the same
degree, all three are segments of maximal degree. The segment labelled c with
maximum formula C ∧ D is not topmost, since condition (a) is violated. We
must pick one of the other segments, say the one labelled a. (We assume that
no segments of maximal degree run through the minor premises of ∨e and ∧e.)
We first permute the ∨e rule across the ∧e rule to obtain:
⊢ A,B,C
∨i
⊢ A ∨Ba, C
⊢ D
wr
⊢ A ∨Bb, D
∧i
⊢ A ∨Ba, A ∨Bb, C ∧Dc
cr
⊢ A ∨Ba,b, C ∧Dc A ⊢ F B ⊢ F
∨e
⊢ C ∧Dc, F C,D ⊢ E
∧e
⊢ E,F
Now the ∨e follows a contraction; we replace it with two ∨E rules, the first of
which ends the segment a.
⊢ A,B,C
∨i
⊢ A ∨Ba, C
⊢ D
wr
⊢ A ∨Bb, D
∧i
⊢ A ∨Ba, A ∨Bb, C ∧Dc A ⊢ F B ⊢ F
∨e
⊢ A ∨Bb, C ∧Dc, F A ⊢ F B ⊢ F
∨e
⊢ C ∧Dc, F, F
cr
⊢ C ∧Dc, F C,D ⊢ E
∧e
⊢ E,F
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Note that only one premise of the ∨i rule contains the maximal formula of the
segment labelled a—the left one. We obtain:
⊢ A,B,C
∨i
⊢ A ∨Ba, C A ⊢ F B ⊢ F
∨e
⊢ F,C
⊢ D
wr
⊢ A ∨Bb, D
∧i
⊢ A ∨Bb, F, C ∧Dc A ⊢ F B ⊢ F
∨e
⊢ C ∧Dc, F, F
cr
⊢ C ∧Dc, F C,D ⊢ E
∧e
⊢ E,F
The segment labelled a is now of length 1 and can be removed. The segment
labelled b is the new topmost segment of maximal degree; the segment labelled
c is considered when that one is removed.
The reader familiar with the normalization proof of Prawitz [1965] will of
course realize that the structure of the preceding proof mirrors that of Prawitz’s
proof very closely. By generalizing the proof, however, we see that its success does
not at all depend on the specific logical inference rules used. The crucial steps
are eliminating segments of length 1, and permuting elimination rules upward
across any inference in which the formula eliminated by ⊛E is not the principal
formula of an ⊛i rule eliminated by the ⊛e rule. The first step always works
if the premises of any ⊛i and ⊛e inference are jointly unsatisfiable clauses, as
is the case with the introduction and general elimination rules constructed by
our general method. The second step also always works, as long as the calculus
has the general form of NsmX, although not all of its features are essential.
For instance, we can modify the proof to work on a calculus with sequences
instead of multisets of formulas but with exchange rules, simply by not counting
exchange inferences in the length of segments. However, we run into problems
if left contraction is explicitly present. In conversion reductions, contractions
are used to simulate resolution inferences by cuts. These cannot in general be
avoided, even if the resolution proof is Horn. For instance, consider
Γ ⊢ A
A,A,Π ⊢ Λ
cl
A,Π ⊢ Λ
cut
Γ,Π ⊢ ∆,Λ
Although such a cut can be replaced by two cuts, it multiplies the context for-
mulas:
Γ ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A A,Π ⊢ Λ
cut
A,Γ,Π ⊢ ∆,Λ
cut
Γ,Γ,Π ⊢ ∆,∆,Λ
To obtain the original conclusion, we would need contraction again. One might
consider replacing the cut rule with a multi-cut or “mix” rule that allows the
removal of any number of occurrences of the cut formula to avoid the difficulty.
Such a rule, however, allows us to simulate contraction (by applying mix to a
suitable initial sequent), and so nothing is gained. In natural deduction where
assumptions are labelled, these problems are avoided since the work of contrac-
tions on the right is done by having assumptions in different initial sequents
sharing a label.
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Proposition 15. A calculusNpmX resulting from N
l
mX by replacing any gen-
eral elimination rules by specialized elimination rules also normalizes.
Proof. To verify that segments of length 1 can always be removed, we have
to establish that there are always simplification conversions for ⊛I rules followed
immediately by a specialized ⊛e′ rule. The set of clauses corresponding to the
premises of the original (or derived) general elimination rule⊛e together with the
clauses corresponding to the premises of the ⊛i rule are unsatisfiable. We again
obtain a derivation using only cuts and structural rules of the conclusion of the
⊛e′ inference by adding the context formulas Γi, ∆i to the clauses corresponding
to the premises of ⊛i, and adding Γj , ∆j to the clauses corresponding to the
minor premises of ⊛e′. The clauses corresponding to the missing minor premises
are all of the form x : A ⊢. Add A to its right side and every sequent inferred
from it. The clause thus turns into an initial sequent; A remains present in the
succedent of any sequent derived from x : A ⊢ A, thus also in the last sequent of
the derivation fragment.
One easily verifies that ⊛e′ rules also permute across other rules. ⊣
§8. Single-conclusion sequent calculi. From the multiple conclusion se-
quent calculus LK we obtain a single-conclusion system LJ by restricting the
succedent in every rule and every sequent in a proof to contain at most one for-
mula. The calculus LJ is sound and complete for intuitionistic logic. This idea
can be applied to any calculus LX, of course, and results in an “intuitionistic”
variant of the calculus.
We begin by considering the sequent calculus LJX resulting from LX by
restricting the rules in such a way that the succedent is guaranteed to contain at
most one formula. This requires first of all that the premises of each rule have
at most one auxiliary formula in the succedent. This can always be achieved
by replacing a rule that does not satisfy this condition by split rules that do
(see Corollary 5). We will assume that the logical rules of LX do satisfy this
condition.
The restriction in LJX requires that in any application of a rule, the succedent
of the premises and conclusion contains at most one formula. This means that
in every right rule, ∆ is empty. Furthermore, if a premise of a left rule has an
auxiliary formula Λi in the succedent, ∆ must also be empty in that premise
(i.e., there is no side formula). If all premises of a left rule have an auxiliary
formula on the right, then no premise allows a side formula ∆, and the succedent
of the conclusion of the rule is empty. We’ll call rules of this form restricted.
The wr and cut rules now take the form:
Γ ⊢
wr
Γ ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ A A,Π ⊢ Λ
cut
Γ,Π ⊢ Λ
where Λ may contain at most one formula.
The intuitionistic sequent calculus LJ is the single-conclusion sequent calculus
corresponding to the multi-conclusion classical sequent calculus LK obtained in
this way.
Proposition 16. If LJX proves Γ ⊢ ∆ (and ∆ thus contains at most one
formula), then LX does as well. The converse does not hold in general.
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Proof. Proofs in LJX can be translated into proofs in LX directly, adding
weakenings to provide the missing shared side formulas ∆ in succedents of left
rules LX if necessary. A counterexample to the converse is given by ⊢ A ∨ ¬A,
which is provable in LK but not in LJ. ⊣
Not every set of restricted rules will result in a reasonable single-conclusion
sequent calculus. For instance, consider the restricted rules for 9, the negated
conditional (aka “exclusion”) in which the left and right rules for→ are reversed:
A,Γ ⊢ B
9l
A 9 B,Γ ⊢
Γ ⊢ A B,Γ ⊢
9r
Γ ⊢ A 9 B
Note that the succedent is required to be empty in the right premise of 9r and
in the conclusion of 9l. Because of this, A 9 B ⊢ A 9 B cannot be derived
from A ⊢ A and B ⊢ B. In the regular sequent calculus for 9 we would have:
A ⊢ A
B ⊢ B
B,A ⊢ B
9r
A ⊢ B,A 9 B
A ⊢ A 9 B,B
9l
A 9 B ⊢ A 9 B
A ⊢ A
A ⊢ A,B
9l
A 9 B ⊢ A
B ⊢ B
A,B ⊢ B
9l
A 9 B,B ⊢
B,A 9 B ⊢
9r
A 9 B ⊢ A 9 B
These are not correct derivations in the restricted calculus.3 To obtain a set of
rules in which it is possible to give such a derivation, we must split the 9l rule
further to guarantee that no premise has auxiliary formulas on both the left and
the right side:
A,Γ ⊢ ∆
9l1
A 9 B,Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ B
9l2
A 9 B,Γ ⊢
Now the derivation can be carried out:
A ⊢ A
9l1
A 9 B ⊢ A
B ⊢ B
9l2
A 9 B,B ⊢
B,A 9 B ⊢
9r
A 9 B ⊢ A 9 B
(This corresponds to the right of the two derivations above; a version corre-
sponding to the left one, where we first apply 9r and then 9l is not possible
since the right premise of the restricted 9r must have empty succedent.)
Perhaps surprisingly, insufficient intuitionistic calculi can also result from split-
ting rules too much. Consider the restricted rules for nand, i.e., the Sheffer
stroke:
A,B,Γ ⊢
|r
Γ ⊢ A | B
Γ ⊢ A Γ ⊢ B |l
A | B,Γ ⊢
3The inability of a set of rules to derive ⊛( ~A) ⊢ ⊛( ~A) from Ai ⊢ Ai is of course not a
proof that the rules are incomplete, especially since we do not have a semantics with respect
to which the question can be posed. However, assuming the semantics validate substitution of
equivalent formulas and there are pairs of equivalent formulas, cut-free incompleteness follows.
For instance, it will be impossible to give a cut-free proof of ⊛(A) ⊢ ⊛(A∧A) without deriving
it from sequents A ⊢ A, A ⊢ A ∧ A, and A ∧ A ⊢ A using only the rules for ⊛, whatever they
may be.
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Table 6. Single conclusion sequent rules for some unusual connectives
connective rules
A 9 B
Γ ⊢ A B,Γ ⊢
9r
Γ ⊢ A 9 B
(exclusion)
Γ ⊢ B
9l1
A 9 B,Γ ⊢
A,Γ ⊢ ∆
9l2
A 9 B,Γ ⊢ ∆
A | B (nand)
A,B,Γ ⊢
|r
Γ ⊢ A | B
Γ ⊢ A Γ ⊢ B |l
A | B,Γ ⊢
A ↓ B (nor)
A,Γ ⊢ B,Γ ⊢
↓r
Γ ⊢ A ↓ B
Γ ⊢ A ↓l1
A ↓ B,Γ ⊢
Γ ⊢ B ↓l2
A ↓ B,Γ ⊢
A⊕B
Γ ⊢ A A,B,Γ ⊢
⊕r1
Γ ⊢ A⊕B
Γ ⊢ B A,B,Γ ⊢
⊕r2
Γ ⊢ A⊕B
(xor)
A,Γ ⊢ ∆ B,Γ ⊢ ∆
⊕l1
A⊕B,Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ B Γ ⊢ A ⊕l2
A⊕B,Γ ⊢
A→ B/C
A,Γ ⊢ B Γ ⊢ A
→/r1
Γ ⊢ A→ B/C
A,Γ ⊢ B Γ ⊢ C
→/r2
Γ ⊢ A→ B/C
(if then else)
A,B,Γ ⊢ ∆ Γ ⊢ A
→/l1
A→ B/C,Γ ⊢ ∆
A,B,Γ ⊢ ∆ C,Γ ⊢ ∆
→/l2
A→ B/C,Γ ⊢ ∆
These can derive A | B ⊢ A | B from atomic sequents:
A ⊢ A
A,B ⊢ A
B ⊢ B
A,B ⊢ B
|l
A | B,A,B ⊢
A,B,A | B ⊢
|r
A | B ⊢ A | B
However, this is not possible when the |r rule is split into
A,Γ ⊢
|r1
Γ ⊢ A | B and
B,Γ ⊢
|r2
Γ ⊢ A | B
In the unrestricted calculus, the last inference of the above proof can be replaced
by
A,B,A | B ⊢
|r1
B,A | B ⊢ A | B
|r2
A | B ⊢ A | B,A | B
cr
A | B ⊢ A | B
The application of |r2 is not allowed in the restricted calculus, since there the
right side of the premise is restricted to be empty.
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The question of when suitable restricted calculi LJX are sound and complete
for (something like) an intuitionistic semantics will be the topic of a future paper
(but see Baaz and Fermu¨ller [1996] and Geuvers and Hurkens [2017] for results in
this direction). However, any calculus the rules of which satisfy the restriction,
also has cut elimination.
Proposition 17. The cut elimination theorem holds for LJX.
Proof. The rules for LJX are obtained, if necessary, by first splitting rules to
guarantee that the premises of of the rule contain at most one auxiliary formula
on the right. In this case, the clauses corresponding to the premises of a rule for a
connective are Horn, i.e., they contain at most one positive literal. Resolution on
Horn clauses only produces Horn clauses. Since the set of clauses corresponding
to the premises of a pair of ⊛l and ⊛r rules is unsatisfiable (even when these
are split rules), it has a resolution refutation consisting only of Horn clauses. As
before, we can add the side formulas of the actual premises to this resolution
refutation to obtain a derivation of the conclusion of the mix from the premises
of the ⊛l and ⊛r rules. Since each premise has at most one formula in the
succedent, mix inferences cannot result in more than one formula on the right
in the resulting proof segment. Thus the mix on ⊛( ~A) can be replaced with a
sequence of mixes with the subformulas Ai as mix formulas in LJX.
When permuting mix inferences with rules to reduce the rank, we have to
verify that the resulting inferences obey the restrictions of the rules of LJX.
First of all, observe that if the inference ending in the left premise of the mix is
⊛r, the mix formula must be ⊛( ~A) and thus the left rank is 1. Thus we never
have to permute a mix with an ⊛r rule on the left side of a mix.
If the last inference on the right side of the mix is ⊛L introducing the mix
formula, we start from a derivation that has the form
Γ ⊢ ⊛( ~A)
· · · Π′i,Θ ⊢ Ξi,Λ
′
i · · ·
⊛l
⊛( ~A),Θ ⊢ Ξ
mix : ⊛( ~A)
Γ,Θ∗ ⊢ ∆∗,Ξ
where Ξi is empty if Λ
′
i is not, and is Ξ otherwise. Ξ itself is empty if no Λ
′
i is
empty. This guarantees that Ξ and Ξi,Λ
′
i all contain at most one formula. This
is converted to
Γ ⊢ ⊛( ~A) Π′i,Θ ⊢ Ξi,Λ
′
i
mix : ⊛( ~A)
Γ,Π′i,Θ
∗ ⊢ Ξi,Λ′i
Since by induction hypothesis, this mix can be removed, we get mix-free deriva-
tions of Π′i,Γ,Θ
∗ ⊢ Ξi,Λ′i (by applying suitable xl inferences). These are exactly
the premises of a correct ⊛l inference, as required. Now consider
Γ ⊢ ⊛( ~A)
· · · Π′i,Γ,Θ
∗ ⊢ Ξi,Λ′i · · ·
⊛l
⊛( ~A),Γ,Θ∗ ⊢ Ξ
mix : ⊛( ~A)
Γ,Π′i,Θ
∗ ⊢ Ξi,Λ′i
As ⊛( ~A) does not occur in Π′i,Γ,Θ
∗, the right rank is now 1, and by induction
hypothesis the mix can be eliminated.
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The other interesting cases where the right premise is the conclusion of ⊛l
not introducing the mix formula or of ⊛r are similar. ⊣
As an example of reducing the degree of a mix on a formula introduced by
restricted left and right rules other than the usual ones in LJ, consider the
calculus for the Sheffer stroke from before. A mix of rank 2 on A | B,
A,B,Γ ⊢
|r
Γ ⊢ A | B
Θ ⊢ A Θ ⊢ B |l
A | B,Θ ⊢
mix : A | B
Γ,Θ ⊢
is reduced to mix inferences on A and B:
Θ ⊢ B
Θ ⊢ A A,B,Γ ⊢
mix : A
Θ, B,Γ ⊢
mix : B
Θ,Θ,Γ ⊢
This corresponds to the resolution refutation:
⊢ B
⊢ A A,B ⊢
B ⊢
⊢
§9. Classical single-conclusion sequent calculi. It is possible to turn
an intuitionistic, single-conclusion sequent calculus into a classical one without
allowing multiple formulas in the succedent. The simplest way to do this is to
introduce additional initial sequents, e.g., ⊢ A ∨ ¬A or ¬¬A ⊢ A. In natural
deduction, a classical system can also be obtained from NJ by adding axioms,
but it is more, well, natural to add a rule instead. Prawitz [1965] proposed the
classical absurdity rule
¬A,Γ ⊢ ⊥
⊥CΓ ⊢ A
For the sequent calculus, the corresponding rule would replace ⊥ in the conclu-
sion with an empty succedent:
¬A,Γ ⊢
⊥C
Γ ⊢ A
Equivalent rules are double negation elimination and rule of excluded middle:
A,Γ ⊢ C ¬A,Γ ⊢ C
gem
Γ ⊢ C
These rules, however, do not have the subformula property in at least the ex-
tended sense that ⊥C does, where every formula in the premise is a subformula
of a formula in the conclusion or the negation of one.
Suppose now that something like the negation connective is present in X and
that LJX has the usual ¬l and ¬r rules. It suffices in fact that a connective
that behaves like ¬ can be expressed with the connectives of X in such a way
that the ¬l and ¬r rules can be simulated. E.g., if the Sheffer stroke is present,
the corresponding version of the ⊥C rule would be
A | A,Γ ⊢
⊥CΓ ⊢ A
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Proposition 18. If LX proves Γ ⊢ ∆ then LJX + ⊥C proves Γ ⊢ ∆ (if ∆
contains at most one formula).
Proof. We define a translation of proofs in LX to proofs in LJX + ⊥C by
induction on the height of a proof in LX. The end-sequent of a translation of a
proof of Γ ⊢ ∆, D is Γ,∆¬ ⊢ D, where ∆¬ is ¬An, . . . ,¬A1 if ∆ is A1, . . . , An.
The translation of a proof of Γ ⊢ also ends in Γ ⊢ .
The translation of an initial sequent A ⊢ A is just A ⊢ A.
If the proof ends in wr, either add wr if the succedent of the premise is empty,
or wl on the negation of the weakening formula plus xl.
If the proof ends in xr where the exchanged formulas do not include the
rightmost formula, add suitable xl inferences to the translation of the proof of
the premise.
A proof ending in cr is translated as follows:
Γ ⊢ ∆, D,D
cr
Γ ⊢ ∆, D
Γ,¬D,∆¬ ⊢ D
¬l
¬D,Γ,¬D,∆¬ ⊢
xl
¬D,¬D,Γ,∆¬ ⊢
cl
¬D,Γ,∆¬ ⊢
⊥C
Γ,∆¬ ⊢ D
A proof ending in xr in which the rightmost formula is active is translated as
follows:
Γ ⊢ ∆, D,C
xr
Γ ⊢ ∆, C,D
Γ,¬D,∆¬ ⊢ C
¬l
¬C,Γ,¬D,∆¬ ⊢
xl
¬D,Γ,¬C,∆¬ ⊢
⊥CΓ,¬C,∆¬ ⊢ D
If the proof ends in a cut, in a weakening or contraction on the left, or in a
logical inference, add the corresponding inferences to the translations of the
proofs ending in the premise(s). ⊣
The converse of course also holds, since every application of a rule of LJX is
also a correct application of a rule of LX, and ⊥C can be derived in LX by
A ⊢ A ¬r
⊢ A,¬A ¬A,Γ ⊢
cut
Γ ⊢ A
In order to obtain cut elimination results for LJX, it is convenient to replace
the ⊥C rule with a classical version of the cut rule:
¬A,Γ ⊢ A,Π ⊢ Λ
kut
Γ,Π ⊢ Λ
(Λ contains at most one formula.)
The kut rule can simulate the ⊥C rule over LJX:
¬A,Γ ⊢
⊥CΓ ⊢ A
¬A,Γ ⊢ A ⊢ A
kut
Γ ⊢ A
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In the reverse direction, ⊥C together with cut can simulate kut:
¬A,Γ ⊢ A,Π ⊢ Λ
kut
Γ,Π ⊢ Λ
¬A,Γ ⊢
⊥CΓ ⊢ A A,Π ⊢ Λ
cut
Γ,Π ⊢ Λ
(Again, Λ contains at most one formula.)
Consequently, the previous result establishing structure-preserving transla-
tions of LX proofs into LJX + ⊥C proofs also transfers to LJX + kut proofs.
As an example, consider the derivation of excluded middle in LJ+kut given by
A ⊢ A ∨r1
A ⊢ A ∨ ¬A ¬l
¬(A ∨ ¬A), A ⊢
xl
A,¬(A ∨ ¬A) ⊢
¬r
¬(A ∨ ¬A) ⊢ ¬A
∨r2
¬(A ∨ ¬A) ⊢ A ∨ ¬A
¬l
¬(A ∨ ¬A),¬(A ∨ ¬A) ⊢
cl
¬(A ∨ ¬A) ⊢ A ∨ ¬A ⊢ A ∨ ¬A
kut
⊢ A ∨ ¬A
The gem rule is also derivable using kut:
¬A,Γ ⊢ C
¬l
¬C,¬A,Γ ⊢
xl
¬A,¬C,Γ ⊢ A,Π ⊢ C
kut
¬C,Γ,Π ⊢ C
¬l
¬C,¬C,Γ,Π ⊢
cl
¬C,Γ,Π ⊢ C ⊢ C
kut
Γ,Π ⊢ C
The restricted system LJX enjoys cut elimination in precisely the same way LJ
does. However, for the corresponding classical systems LJX+⊥C and LJX+kut
the situation is more complicated. Clearly, ⊥C and kut, considered as variant
cut rules, cannot be eliminated from proofs in LJX. We might hope, however,
that cut can be eliminated from proofs in LJX+⊥C and LJX+kut, and that
we can “control” the applications of ⊥C and kut, e.g., to atomic A. This was
shown by Negri and von Plato [2001] to hold for their related systemG3ip+gem,
via the Schu¨tte-Tait method of cut elimination.
Like cut, neither ⊥C nor kut permute across cr. In order to study Gentzen’s
cut-elimination procedure for LJX we should thus consider their analogs to
Gentzen’s mix rule which allows the removal of any number of occurrences of
the cut formula A, not just the outermost ones. Let us call these rules ⊥∗C and
kix.
It is, however, possible to obtain restricted cut elimination results for kut.
Proposition 19. kix permutes with mix.
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Proof. We give the derivations for cases where the rules are also applications
of kut and cut for simplicity.
¬A,Γ ⊢ A,Π ⊢ C
kix
Γ,Π ⊢ C Π′ ⊢ Λ′
mix
Γ,Π,Π′ ⊢ Λ′
¬A,Γ ⊢
A,Π ⊢ C C,Π′ ⊢ Λ′
mix
A,Π,Π′ ⊢ Λ′
kix
Γ,Π,Π′ ⊢ Λ′
Γ ⊢ C
¬A,C,Π ⊢ A,Π′ ⊢ Λ′
kix
C,Π,Π′ ⊢ Λ′
mix
Γ,Π,Π′ ⊢ Λ′
Γ ⊢ C
¬A,C,Π ⊢
C,¬A,Γ ⊢
mix
¬A,Γ,Π ⊢ A,Π′ ⊢ Λ′
kix
Γ,Π,Π′ ⊢ Λ′
Note that if C is ¬A in the second case, the starting derivation is impossible,
since the conclusion of the mix then does not contain C on the left. ⊣
By contrast, ⊥∗C (and thus also ⊥C) does not permute with mix. Consider the
following case:
¬A,Γ ⊢
⊥∗CΓ ⊢ A A,Π ⊢ C
mix
Γ,Π ⊢ C
Since the cut formula A does not appear in the succedent of the premise of the
⊥∗C rule, we cannot apply the mix rule to it. If we first use wr to introduce the
cut formula A in the succedent, the conclusion sequent still contains ¬A on the
left, but application of ⊥∗C is blocked by the presence of C in the succedent. It
would be possible to derive from A,Π ⊢ C the sequent ¬C,Π ⊢ ¬A (using ¬l
and ¬r) and then apply a mix on ¬A, but this would increase the degree of the
mix formula and (because of the additional inferences required) would not be
guaranteed to decrease the rank of the mix.
One last strategy to avoid this difficulty would be to show that we can trans-
form the proof of the premise of ⊥∗C into one of its conclusion that avoids the
⊥∗C inference and does not increase the height of that subproof. Then the ap-
plication of mix would apply to two subproofs of lower height than the original
(since the ⊥∗C rule would be removed) and so the induction hypothesis would
apply. However, the conclusion ⊥∗C rule is in general not provable without ⊥
∗
C
at all. Consider the case ¬(A∨¬A) ⊢ , which is derivable without ⊥C . However,
the corresponding conclusion of ⊥C , ⊢ A ∨ ¬A, is not so derivable.
Proposition 20. kix can be replaced by mix if the cut formula ¬A is principal
in the left premise.
Proof. If ¬A is principal, it was introduced by a ¬l rule. Then we can
replace
Γ ⊢ A ¬l
¬A,Γ ⊢ A,Π ⊢ Λ
kix
Γ,Π ⊢ Λ by
Γ ⊢ A A,Π ⊢ Λ
mix
Γ,Π ⊢ Λ ⊣
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Table 7. Single-conclusion natural deduction rules for some
unusual connectives
connective rules
A 9 B
Γ1 ⊢ A B,Γ2 ⊢
9i
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ A 9 B
(exclusion)
Γ0 ⊢ A 9 B Γ1 ⊢ B
9e1
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢
Γ0 ⊢ A 9 B A,Γ1 ⊢ D
9e2
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ D
A | B (nand)
A,B,Γ ⊢
|i
Γ ⊢ A | B
Γ0 ⊢ A | B Γ1 ⊢ A Γ2 ⊢ B
|e
Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 ⊢
A ↓ B (nor)
A,Γ1 ⊢ ⊥ B,Γ2 ⊢
↓i
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ A ↓ B
Γ0 ⊢ A ↓ B Γ1 ⊢ A
↓e1
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢
Γ0 ⊢ A ↓ B Γ1 ⊢ B
↓e2
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢
A⊕B
Γ1 ⊢ A A,B,Γ2 ⊢ ⊕i1
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ A⊕B
Γ1 ⊢ B A,B,Γ2 ⊢ ⊕i2
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ A⊕B
(xor)
Γ0 ⊢ A⊕B A,Γ1 ⊢ D B,Γ2 ⊢ D ⊕e1
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ D
Γ0 ⊢ A⊕B Γ1 ⊢ B Γ2 ⊢ A ⊕e2
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2 ⊢
A→ B/C
A,Γ1 ⊢ B Γ2 ⊢ A
→/i1
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ A→ B/C
A,Γ1 ⊢ B Γ2 ⊢ C
→/i2
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ A→ B/C
(if then else)
Γ0 ⊢ A→ B/C A,B,Γ2 ⊢ D Γ2 ⊢ A
→/e1
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ D
Γ0 ⊢ A→ B/C A,B,Γ1 ⊢ D C,Γ2 ⊢ D
→/e2
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ D
§10. Single-conclusion natural deduction. We have seen that the multi-
conclusion “sequent style” natural deduction systems NlmX always normalize.
If we restrict the succedent of sequents in derivations to at most one formula,
we obtain a single-conclusion “sequent style” natural deduction system NlX.
This will be an “intuitionistic” version of NlmX. For the standard set of logical
operators, this system is the standard intuitionistic natural deduction system
in sequent style, with one slight difference. In the standard systems, the succe-
dent of sequents always contains exactly one formula; an empty succedent is
represented by the contradiction symbol ⊥. So, if we are content to add the
contradiction constant ⊥ to the language, we can obtain the standard systems
simply by marking every empty succedent in the rules of NlX with ⊥.
An example rule of an intuitionistic sequent-style natural deduction rule would
be
Γ0 ⊢ A→ B Γ1 ⊢ A B,Γ2 ⊢ ∆2
→e
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ ∆2
34 RICHARD ZACH
Proposition 21. NlX normalizes.
Proof. By inspection of the proof of Theorem 14. The definition of maximal
segments is now simpler; the same definition as in Prawitz [1965] applies. The
cases required for the reduction of the length of segments are now fewer in
number. There is no cr rule. The major premise of the ⊛e rule cannot be
the conclusion of an ⊙i rule. If it is the conclusion of an ⊙E rule, the segment
cannot run through the major premise.
Because the premises of the logical rules are restricted, the resolution refu-
tation of the clauses corresponding to the premises of the ⊛I and the minor
premises of the ⊛e rule proceeds via Horn clauses. These Horn clauses plus any
context formulas result in a derivation of the conclusion of the ⊛( ~A) rule from
the premises of the of the ⊛i and the minor premises of the ⊛e rule. ⊣
Like in the case of the sequent calculus, where we obtained a single-conclusion
system equivalent to LX by adding the ⊥C rule to LJX, it is possible to obtain
a classical single-conclusion sequent-style natural deduction system. In order
to be able to translate derivations in LJX + ⊥C to a single-conclusion natural
deduction derivations, we have to add the natural-deduction version of ⊥C (or
equivalent rules) to NlX, such as:
¬A,Γ ⊢
⊥CΓ ⊢ A
¬A,Γ ⊢ C A,Γ ⊢ C
lem
Γ,Π ⊢ C
¬A,Γ ⊢ A,Π ⊢ C
kut
Γ,Π ⊢ C
With lem we can derive kut, with kut we can derive ⊥C , and with ⊥C + cut
we can derive lem.
The proof of normalization for classical single-conclusion natural deduction
including the rule ⊥C is more complicated than both the pure intuitionist case
and the multi-conclusion case. This is due to the fact that the notion of maxi-
mal segment must be extended to include sequences of formulas beginning with
the conclusion of ⊥C and ending with a major premise of an elimination rule.
Such segments are harder to remove. Although Prawitz [1965] already showed
normalization for the fragment excluding ∨, normalization of the full system was
not established until St˚almarck [1991].
Conjecture 22. NlX+⊥C normalizes.
§11. Proof terms and formulas-as-types. Under the Curry-Howard iso-
morphism, proofs in NlX can be assigned proof terms, just like they can in the
standard intuitionistic cases. Under this isomorphism, conversions of inference
segments used to reduce or permute inferences correspond to operations on proof
terms. The general case considered here suggests that it might be fruitful to sep-
arate the proof operation of substitution, which corresponds to the cut rule, from
the conversions themselves.
For each connective ⊛, we may introduce two function symbols, one that
applies to premises of an introduction rule (a proof constructor), and one to the
premises of an elimination rule (a proof destructor). The types of these functions
are given by the corresponding auxiliary formulas; and their conversion clauses by
the corresponding derivation simplifications obtained from resolution refutations.
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Labels of discharged assumptions are abstracted similar to λ-abstraction. We
begin by considering some familiar examples.
Conjunction can be given a single introduction rule in Horn form,
Γ1 ⊢ A Γ2 ⊢ B ∧i
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ A ∧B
The constructor corresponding to ∧i is the pairing function, c∧. It takes two
arguments, one for each premise. If the premises end in derivations labelled
by s and t, respectively, we label the derivation ending in the conclusion by
c∧(s, t). We may include this in the statement of the rule itself, by adding a
type annotation on the right:
Γ1 ⊢ s : A Γ2 ⊢ t : B ∧i
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ c∧(s, t) : A ∧B
Split general elimination rules are
Γ0 ⊢ A ∧B A,Γ1 ⊢ Λ ∧e1
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ Λ
Γ0 ⊢ A ∧B B,Γ1 ⊢ Λ ∧e2
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ Λ
They correspond to the two destructors d∧1 , d
∧
2 , and the rules may be written:
Γ0 ⊢ t : A ∧B x : A,Γ1 ⊢ s1 : C ∧e1
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ d∧1 (t, [x]s1) : C
Γ0 ⊢ t : A ∧B x : B,Γ1 ⊢ s2 : C ∧e2
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ d∧2 (t, [x]s2) : C
Such a destructor may be seen as a generalized λ abstraction operator; the x in
the second argument is bound.
A cut inference is treated using a substitution operator,
Γ ⊢ s : A x : A,Π ⊢ t : C
cut : x
Γ,Π ⊢ subst(s, x, [x]t) : C
It too binds the label of the discharged assumption x : A.
An ∧i inference followed by an ∧e1 inference may be reduced from
Γ1 ⊢ s : A Γ2 ⊢ t : B ∧i
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ c∧(s, t) : A ∧B x : A,Γ3 ⊢ u : C
∧e1
Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 ⊢ d∧1 (c
∧(s, t), [x]u)
to
Γ1 ⊢ s : A x : A,Γ3 ⊢ u : C
cut : x
Γ1,Γ3 ⊢ subst(s, x, [x]u) : C
and similarly for an ∧i followed by a ∧e2 inference.
The corresponding reductions for proof terms then are:
d∧1 (c
∧(s, t), [x]u)→ subst(s, x, [x]u)
d∧2 (c
∧(s, t), [x]u)→ subst(t, x, [x]u)
A single general elimination rule for ∧ is given by
Γ0 ⊢ A ∧B A,B,Γ1 ⊢ C
∧e
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ C
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The destructor corresponding to it is d∧, it takes two arguments, the proof terms
for the major and minor premise. The labels of the discharged assumptions are
abstracted. The rule with proof terms is as follows:
Γ0 ⊢ s : A ∧B x : A, y : B,Γ1 ⊢ t : C
∧e
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ d∧(s, [x, y]t) : C
The proof simplification corresponding to a ∧i followed by ∧e is:
Γ1 ⊢ s : A Γ2 ⊢ t : B ∧i
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ c∧(s, t) : A ∧B x : A, y : B,Γ3 ⊢ u : C
∧e
Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 ⊢ d∧(c∧(s, t), [x, y]u)
to
Γ2 ⊢ t : B
Γ1 ⊢ s : A x : A, y : B,Γ3 ⊢ u : C
cut : x
y : B,Γ1,Γ3 ⊢ subst(s, x, [x]u) : C
cut : y
Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 ⊢ subst(t, y, (subst(s, x, [x]u)) : C
Correspondingly, the β-conversion rule for c∧/d∧ is
d∧(c∧(s, t), [x, y]u)→ subst(t, y, subst(s, x, [x, y]u))
For the conditional, the introduction and general elimination rules are
x : A,Γ ⊢ s : B
→i
Γ ⊢ c→([x]s) : A→ B
Γ1 ⊢ s : A→ B Γ2 ⊢ t : A x : B,Γ3 ⊢ u : C
→e
Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 ⊢ d→(s, t, [x]u) : C
Here c→([x]s) is just a complex way of writing λx.s. d→(s, t, [x]u) is the general-
ized application operator of Joachimski and Matthes [2003]. The corresponding
proof simplification obtained from a resolution refutation of the premises is
x : A,Γ1 ⊢ s : B
→i
Γ1 ⊢ c→([x]s) : A→ B Γ2 ⊢ t : A x : B,Γ3 ⊢ u : C
→e
Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 ⊢ d→(c→([x]s), t, [x]u) : C
to
Γ2 ⊢ t : A x : A,Γ1 ⊢ s : B
cut : x
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ subst(t, x, [x]s) : B x : B,Γ3 ⊢ u : C
cut : x
Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 ⊢ subst(subst(t, x, [x]s), x, [x]u) : C
The β-reduction rule for the c→/d→ pair is then:
d→(c→([x]s), t, [x]u)→ subst(subst(t, x, [x]s), x, [x]u)
or, if we prefer standard notation
app(λx.s, t, [x]u) → u[s[t/x]/x]
In general, we have the following situation: For a connective with introduction
rules ⊛ik and elimination rules ⊛el we introduce function symbols: constructors
c⊛k and destructors d
⊛
l . Each such function symbol has the same arity as the
corresponding rule has premises. In an application of the rule, the succedent of
the conclusion is labelled by the term
c⊛k ([~x
k
1 ]s
k
1 , . . . , [~x
k
n]s
k
n) or d
⊛
l (s0, [~x
l
1]s
l
1, . . . , [~x
l
m]s
l
m),
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where the si are the terms labelling the succedents of the premise sequents and
~xi are the labels of the assumptions discharged in the i-th premise.
The β-reduction rule for a redex of the form
d⊛l (c
⊛
k ([~x
k
1 ]s
k
1 , . . . , [~x
k
n]s
k
n), [~x
l
1]s
l
1, . . . , [~x
l
m]s
l
m)
is provided by the corresponding simplification conversion on proofs, which in
turn is given by a derivation segment consisting only of cut rules, i.e., a resolution
refutation of the premises of the⊛ii and⊛ej rules. This simplification conversion
produces a term built from the arguments ski and s
l
j using only subst operations.
There are corresponding general α conversions: replace any subterm of the form
[x]s by [y]s′ where s′ is the result of substituting y for every free occurrence of x
in s, provided y is free for x in s. η-conversion corresponds to converting between
[x]s and s, provided x is not free in s. Finally, we define substitution redexes
subst(t, y, [~x]s) which convert to [~z]s′, where s′ is s with every free occurrence
of y in s replaced by t, provided t is free for y in s and y occurs in ~x, and ~z is ~x
without y. If y /∈ ~x, then subst(t, y, [~x]s) converts to [~x]s.
Conjecture 23. The typed λ-calculus obtained in this way strongly normal-
izes.
§12. Free Deduction. Parigot [1992a] has introduced a calculus he called
free deduction FD. It has pairs of rules for each connective called left and
right elimination rules. The right elimination rules are just the general elimi-
nation rules of sequent-style natural deduction. Left elimination rules are what
Milne [2015] has called “general introduction rules.” Rather than adding the
complex formula containing a connective as a conclusion, they allow assump-
tions containing the complex formula to be discharged. They are thus perfectly
symmetric with the general elimination rule. The major premise contains the
principal formula not on the right (as a conclusion) but on the left (as a dis-
charged assumption).
For instance, the FD rules for → are:
A→ B,Γ ⊢ ∆ A,Π ⊢ Σ
→le1
Γ,Π ⊢ ∆,Σ
A→ B,Γ ⊢ ∆ Π ⊢ Σ, B
→le2
Γ,Π ⊢ ∆,Σ
and
Γ ⊢ ∆, A→ B Π ⊢ Σ, A B,Π′ ⊢ Σ
→re
Γ,Π,Π′ ⊢ ∆,Σ,Σ′
This is a multi-conclusion version of Milne’s natural deduction system with gen-
eral elimination (right elimination) and general introduction (left elimination)
rules. Here the →le rule is split; an equivalent version has a single rule,
A→ B,Γ ⊢ ∆ A,Π ⊢ Σ, B
→le
Γ,Π ⊢ ∆,Σ
Parigot presents this (and non-split rules for ∧, ∨) as a variant system FD′.
Free deduction rules (and hence Milne’s “general introduction rules”) can be
formulated for arbitrary connectives ⊛ along the same lines as for sequent cal-
culus and natural deduction. Given an introduction rule for ⊛ with premises
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Πi,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λi, the corresponding ⊛le rule is
⊛( ~A),Γ ⊢ ∆ Π1,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λ1 . . . Πn,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λn
⊛le
Γ ⊢ ∆
Free deduction embeds both sequent calculus and natural deduction. The left
and right sequent calculus rules can be simulated by taking the major premise
in the corresponding free deduction right or left elimination rule to be an initial
sequent. The introduction rule of natural deduction is obtained the same way
as the right rule of the sequent calculus from the le rule, e.g.,
⊛( ~A) ⊢ ⊛( ~A) Π1,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λ1 . . . Πn,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λn
⊛le
Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛( ~A)
Cuts in this system are just like segments in natural deduction, except that here
the formula ⊛( ~A) which appears in the major premise of an ⊛e rule at the end of
the segment is—not the conclusion of an ⊛i rule as in natural deduction, but—
discharged by an application of ⊛le at the beginning of a segment. A segment
of length 1 then is of the form,
⊛( ~A),Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛( ~A) · · ·Πi,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λi · · ·
⊛le
Γ ⊢ ∆,⊛( ~A) · · ·Π′j ,Γ ⊢ ∆,Λ
′
j · · ·
⊛re
Γ ⊢ ∆
The cut-elimination mechanism of FD can be straightforwardly adapted to the
generalized case. In this situation, we have to introduce labels not just for
assumptions (formulas occurring on the left of a sequent) but also for those on the
right. A maximal segment can be replaced by a sequence of cuts. As in he case
of natural deduction, cuts correspond to proof substitutions. In FD, however,
not only can we substitute derivations of Γ ⊢ A for assumptions in derivations
of x : A,Π ⊢ Λ, but also conversely substitute a derivation of A,Π ⊢ Λ in a
derivation of Γ ⊢ Λ, x : A. This of course results in a nondeterministic reduction
procedure, as a cut inference may be replaced either by a substitution of the
conclusion of the left premise in corresponding assumptions in the proof ending
in the right premise, or the other way around.
§13. Quantifiers. The basic principle underlying the generation of sequent
calculus and natural deduction rules with the usual proof-theoretic properties can
be extended to quantifiers as well. The important additional aspect of quantifier
rules is that they (sometimes) require eigenvariable conditions, as in the case of
∀r. Eigenvariable conditions are necessary for soundness, but they also guarantee
that terms can be substituted in a proof for a variable appearing in an auxiliary
formula, which is crucial for the cut-elimination and normalization properties.
The correspondence between a sequent calculus rule and a set of clauses also
holds for quantifiers. The most general case of a quantifier for which this model
could be considered has a fixed finite number of bound variables and a fixed
finite number of schematic subformulas which may contain these variables:
Qx1 . . . xm(A1(x1, . . . , xm), . . . , An(x1, . . . , xm)).
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The truth conditions of such a quantifier Q may be given by a set C of clauses,
i.e., a conjunction of disjunctions of literals, where each atom is of the form
Ai(t1, . . . , tm), and where tj is either a variable xj or a Skolem term f(x1, . . . , xk)
with k < j. Under this interpretation, Q~x(A1(~x), . . . , An(~x)) is true iff ∃~f∀~xC.
Similarly, falsity conditions may be given for Q as well.
Such a set of clauses C corresponds to a sequent calculus rule for Qr, by
interpreting a variable xj as an eigenvariable aj and a Skolem term f(x1, . . . , xk)
as schematic variable for a term which may contain the eigenvariables a1, . . . ,
ak). If the truth and falsity conditions for Q underlying the Ql and Qr rules
are mutually exclusive (i.e., in each interpretation at most one of the two is
satisfied), the resulting sequent calculus rules are sound. However, they will be
complete only if it is not the case that the left and right rules each contain both
term and eigenvariables.
Let us consider some examples. The syllogistic quantifiers, e.g., “All As are
Bs” and “Some As are Bs,” fit this scheme:
Ax(A(x), B(x)) iff ∀x(¬A(x) ∨B(x))
¬Ax(A(x), A(x)) iff ∃f(A(f) ∧ ¬B(f))
Sx(A(x), B(x)) iff ∃f(A(f) ∧B(f))
¬Sx(A(x), B(x)) iff ∀x(¬A(x) ∨ ¬B(x))
We obtain the rules
Γ ⊢ ∆, A(t) B(t),Γ ⊢ ∆
Al
Ax(A(x), B(x)),Γ ⊢ ∆
A(a),Γ ⊢ ∆, B(a)
Ar
Γ ⊢ ∆,Ax(A(x), B(x))
and
A(a), B(a),Γ ⊢ ∆
Sl
Sx(A(x), B(x)),Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, A(t) Γ ⊢ ∆, B(t)
Sr
Γ ⊢ ∆, Sx(A(x), B(x))
Scho¨nfinkel’s generalized Sheffer stroke A(x) |x B(x) is the dual of S:
Ux(A(x), B(x)) iff ∀x(¬A(x) ∨ ¬B(x))
¬Ux(A(x), B(x)) iff ∃f(A(f) ∧B(f))
and has the rules
Γ ⊢ ∆, A(t) Γ ⊢ ∆, B(t)
Ul
Ux(A(x), B(x)),Γ ⊢ ∆
A(a), B(a),Γ ⊢ ∆
Ur
Γ ⊢ ∆,Ux(A(x), B(x))
We can also consider non-monadic quantifiers, e.g., the totality quantifier
Txy A(x, y), expressed by
Txy A(x, y) iff ∃f∀xA(x, f(x))
¬Txy A(x, y) iff ∃g∀x¬A(g, x)
with the rules
A(s, b),Γ ⊢ ∆
Tl
Txy A(x, y),Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, A(a, t(a))
Tr
Γ ⊢ ∆,Txy A(x, y)
In Tl, the eigenvariable a may not appear in the conclusion, but also not in t,
while in Tr the eigenvariable a may not appear in the conclusion, but is allowed
to appear in t(a). These rules are sound, but not complete. For instance, there
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is no derivation of Txy A(x, y) ⊢ Txy A(x, y) from instances of A(x, y) ⊢ A(x, y),
since the eigenvariable condition is violated if Tl or Tr is applied to such an
initial sequent.
Of course, not all natural quantifiers can even be provided with rules using
this framework. For instance, the Henkin quantifier
{
∀x∃y
∀u∃v
}
A(x, y, u, v) has
truth conditions given by
∃f∃g∀x∀uA(x, f(x), u, g(u))
but its falsity conditions cannot be stated in this form.
Whether or not the rules obtained this way are complete, they always enjoy
cut-elimination. Since the clause sets C and C′ corresponding to the Ql a Qr
rules are mutually exclusive, C ∪C′ is an unsatisfiable set of clauses. Thus a mix
inference in which the left premise is the conclusion of Qr and the right premise
the conclusion of Ql can be reduced to mix inferences operating on the premises
of the Ql and Qr rules, or on sequents obtained from them by substituting terms
for eigenvariables. For instance, consider
Γ ⊢ ∆, A(a, t(a))
Tr
Γ ⊢ ∆,Txy A(x, y)
A(s, b),Π ⊢ Λ
Tl
Txy A(x, y),Π ⊢ Λ
cut
Γ,Π ⊢ ∆,Λ
The clause set {{¬A(g, x)}, {A(y, f(y))}} is refutable by a single resolution in-
ference, with most general unifier {g 7→ y, f(g) 7→ x}. This means the eigenvari-
able a corresponding to y will be substituted by the term s corresponding to g,
and the eigenvariable b corresponding to x will be substituted by the term corre-
sponding to f(g), i.e., t(s). The restriction that b must not occur in s guarantees
that this latter substitution performed in the proof ending in the premise of TR
can be carried out. We can then replace the cut by
Π ⊢ Λ, A(s, t(s)) A(s, t(s)),Γ ⊢ ∆
cut
Γ,Π ⊢ ∆,Λ
We obtain natural deduction rules just as in the propositional case; normaliza-
tion holds here as well for the same reason: the clause sets corresponding to the
premises of a Qi rule together with the minor premises of a Qe rule are jointly
unsatisfiable, hence refutable by resolution. The resolution refutation translates
into a sequence of cut inferences applied to derivations ending in these premises,
possibly with eigenvariables replaced by terms. The substitution for each cut
inference is provided by the unifier in the corresponding resolution inference;
eigenvariable conditions guarantee that the corresponding substitution of terms
for eigenvariables can be applied to the entire derivation. (This is the idea behind
the “cut elimination by resolution” method of Baaz and Leitsch [2000].)
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